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Abstract
This Article reviews the framework of competition law in the European Union (”UN”), specif-
ically in relation to state aid, mergers, and cartel enforcement. In each case it considers how the
European Commission’s (”Commission”) response can and has adapted existing procedures to
pressing circumstances while maintaining rigidity in the application of legal principles.
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EU COMPETITION POLICY IN THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES 
Michael Reynolds, Sarah Macrory & Michelle Chowdhury* 
INTRODUCTION 
Some claim that competition law obstructs economic 
recovery. While doubts lingered over the contribution of 
competition to general economic policy in periods of economic 
prosperity,1 the advent of the financial crisis may have added grist 
to the mill of competition law’s critics. The criticism of European 
Commission (“Commission”) interference by Axel Weber of 
Bundesbank, for example, was a very public reminder that the 
Commission’s monitoring of state aid is not always welcomed by 
Member States.2 In a period of economic decline, governments 
may now be more susceptible than usual to arguments that 
national prosperity should take priority over enforcement of 
European competition law. They may be tempted to succumb to 
political pressure to champion failing national businesses, ignore 
the abuse by dominant firms of weakened acquisition targets, and 
turn a blind eye to competitors clubbing together to protect 
themselves from falling demand. 
There is precedent for such behavior: during the Great 
Depression, the U.S. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 
encouraged competitors to group together to formulate binding 
 
* Michael Reynolds is a partner in the International Antitrust Group at Allen & 
Overy LLP in London and in Brussels. Sarah Macrory and Michelle Chowdhury were, at 
the time of writing in 2009, trainees at Allen & Overy LLP. The authors would like to 
thank their colleagues at Allen & Overy LLP for their support, particularly Fiona Muir, 
Louise Tolley, Katherine Abrahams, and Julian Ewart. 
1. Peter Freeman, Chairman of the U.K. Competition Commission, refers to this as 
the “end of the ‘competition honeymoon.’” Peter Freeman, Chairman, U.K. 
Competition Comm’n, Speech at the 2009 International Competition Forum in Warsaw: 
Competition Advocacy in Time of Recession: The U.K. Competition Commission’s 
Approach, (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.competitionforum.uokik.gov.pl/download/
freeman_warsaw_150409.pdf. 
2. See James Wilson et al., Bundesbank Chief Hits Out at Brussels, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Apr. 21, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
8d8781c6-2ead-11de-b7d3-00144feabdc0.html. 
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industry codes of fair competition.3 Those codes were exempt 
from antitrust scrutiny and in many cases contained 
anticompetitive provisions such as output restrictions and 
minimum resale prices.4 
Criticism of antitrust measures may be attractive in periods 
of recession, not least because governments are now primary 
stakeholders in some of Europe’s biggest, and most unstable, 
businesses. Yet, the failure to robustly enforce antitrust principles 
arguably prolonged the Great Depression. If exercise of market 
power involves reduction in output and thus employment, then it 
is crucial to ensure enforcement against anticompetitive conduct 
in a recession.5 The preservation of competition within the 
current market structure of a given industry should be prioritized 
because the current crisis makes it more difficult for prospective 
new entrants to exert competitive pressure. Further, the 
recession may not necessarily hit inefficient firms the hardest. 
For example, the liquidity crisis may disproportionally affect 
those firms that happened to require refinancing from 2007 to 
2009.6 The Commission has thus characterized its recent 
achievements as “having avoided a dangerous subsidy race” and 
thus “the worst mistakes of the 1930s.”7 The Commission insists 
that “today’s softness is tomorrow’s nightmare”8 and positions its 
policy as “part of the solution, not part of the problem.”9 Former 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes has stated that “for the Commission 
it is business as usual in cartels, mergers and antitrust.”10 
 
3. See National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, Title I, § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 
(formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (1934)), invalidated by Schecter Poultry Co. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
4. See id. § 5; Andrea Gomes da Silva & Mark Sansom, Antitrust Implications of the 
Financial Crisis: A U.K. and EU View, ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 24–31. 
5. See Philip Lowe, Competition Policy and the Global Economic Crisis, COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2009, at 4. 
6. See Freeman, supra note 1. 
7. Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r for Competition Pol’y, Speech at the EStALI 
Conference: EU State Aid Rules—Part of the Solution (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Kroes, 
EU State Aid Rules]. 
8. Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r for Competition Policy, Address at the 36th Annual 
Conference for International Antitrust Law and Policy at Fordham University: Antitrust 
and State Aid Control—The Lessons Learned (Sept. 24, 2009). 
9. Commission Press Release, MEMO/08/757 (Dec. 2, 2008). 
10. Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r for Competition Policy, Opening Remarks at the 
International Bar Association Conference, “Private and Public Enforcement of EU 
Competition Law—Five Years On”: Many Achievements, More to Do (Mar. 12, 2009) 
[hereinafter Kroes, Many Achievements, More to Do]; see also Neelie Kroes, Eur. 
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Yet, extraordinary times may call for extraordinary measures 
and the Commission and Member States need to tread carefully 
as they attempt to simultaneously show flexibility in procedure 
and rigidity in principles. In relation to mergers, that may mean 
lowering the onerous burdens of review to ensure fast turnover of 
emergency transactions. In doing so, the Commission must be 
careful not to increase the risk of clearing or facilitating deals 
that ultimately lead to consumer harm and to protection of 
inefficient firms. In cartel cases there will be a tension between 
crippling financially vulnerable firms with enormous fines on the 
one hand and ensuring adequate deterrence to future cartelists 
on the other. In the arena of state aid, the challenge is “to 
support financial stability”11 and to protect consumer deposits 
while ensuring that the market is not unfairly distorted by 
government aid. 
The Commission has the unenviable job of balancing such 
interests. In the short term, it will be criticized if seemingly 
beneficial measures, be they government-brokered mergers or 
state aid, are blocked. In the long term, however, too much 
flexibility creates a dangerous precedent, especially in relation to 
fining policy against cartels, leaving firms and the general public 
with the impression that competition law has become redundant. 
This Article reviews the framework of competition law in the 
European Union (“EU”), specifically in relation to state aid, 
mergers, and cartel enforcement. In each case it considers how 
the Commission’s response can and has adapted existing 
procedures to pressing circumstances while maintaining rigidity 
in the application of legal principles. 
I. STATE AID 
By the Commission’s own admission: 
The financial and economic crisis has propelled State aids to 
the top of the agenda of the Commission. The handling of 
the crisis situation is a basic test for the validity and the 
reasoning of the application of European State Aid rules. It 
 
Comm’r for Competition Policy, Address at the Atlantic Council: European Models for 
Economic Recovery (Mar. 26, 2009) (“The third [most important task for the 
Commission] is not going soft on competition enforcement—cartels, antitrust and so 
on—because it will help us out of recession.”). 
11. Lowe, supra note 5, at 7. 
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tests the basic rationale, our ability to communicate and our 
ability for reform.12 
The article 87(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (“EC Treaty”) (now article 107(1) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”))13 
prohibition on state aid and the Commission’s self-professed 
objective of “less and better targeted State aid”14 might appear at 
odds with the policy of fiscal stimuli adopted by governments 
across Europe in response to the exigencies of the global 
financial crisis. 
In accordance with article 88 EC (now article 108 TFEU), 
the Commission is endowed with the responsibility of controlling 
state aid. Member States are obliged to inform the Commission 
of any plan to grant or alter state aid (“ex ante notification”) and 
can only put such aid into effect once it has been authorized by 
the Commission (“standstill principle”).15 Any aid that is granted 
in the absence of Commission approval is automatically classified 
as “unlawful aid” and the Commission has the power to order its 
recovery.16 
Yet, the seriousness and urgency of the financial crisis was 
such that Member States have not always waited for EU approval, 
expected to take months or even years. According to da Silva and 
Sansom: “At the EU level, there is no doubt that the 
Commission’s hand was forced by the present crisis.”17 Neelie 
Kroes herself has spoken of the evolution in policy as a result of 
dealing with the U.K.’s granting of aid to the British bank 
 
12. Herbert Ungerer, Deputy Dir. Gen. with Special Responsibility for State Aid, 
Directorate Gen. Competition, Eur. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 7th Experts’ 
Forum on New Developments in European State Aid Law: State Aids 2008/2009—
Twelve Months of Crisis Management and Reforms 20 (May 14, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2009_05_en.pdf. 
13. Consolidated Version on the Functioning of the European Union art. 107(1), 
2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 91 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing European Community art. 87(1), 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 76–77 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
14. Commission of the European Communities, State Aid Action Plan: Less and 
Better Targeted State Aid: A Roadmap for State Aid Reform 2005–2009, COM (2005) 
107 Final 5 (June 2005). 
15. See Anne Fort, Adm’r, Eur. Comm’n, State Aid Control and Insolvency 4 (Oct. 
8, 2003) (unpublished paper presented at the INSOL 23rd Annual Congress, available at 
http://www.insol-europe.org/events/23rd-annual-congress). 
16. Id. 
17. da Silva & Sansom, supra note 4, at 31. 
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Northern Rock and has acknowledged the need for the 
Commission “to be pragmatic, to be proportionate and to offer 
Member States flexibility in the exact design of their schemes.”18 
Thus, the Commission’s policy and state-aid law itself has 
adapted to the current economic environment. The result of that 
evolution is, as the Commission’s spring 2009 Special Edition of 
the State Aid Score Board19 shows, the adoption of more than 
fifty state-aid decisions between October 2008 and March 2009, 
twelve comprehensive guarantee schemes, five major 
recapitalization schemes, five framework schemes comprising a 
combination of these measures, and a substantial number of ad-
hoc measures concerning certain banks. Since October 2008, the 
Commission has approved a total of over €3.5 trillion in state aid 
measures to financial institutions.20 
A. Definition of State Aid 
What constitutes state aid is itself an evolving concept. The 
general—and arguably ignored—prohibition on state aid in the 
European Union, contained in article 87(1) EC Treaty (now 
article 107(1) TFEU), declares state aid incompatible with the 
Common Market if, insofar as it affects trade between Member 
States, it is “aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods.”21 
The Commission has historically adopted a broad 
interpretation of the notion of “state resources.”22 Aid can 
include “grants, loans at a low rate of interest, deferment of tax 
liabilities, schemes of aid financed by compulsory contributions 
by all traders including those who do not benefit and in general, 
 
18. Commission Press Release, MEMO/08/757, supra note 9. 
19. Commission of the European Communities, State Aid Scoreboard: Spring 2009 
Update, Special Edition on State Aid Interventions in the Current Financial and 
Economic Crisis, COM (2009) 164, 14–21 (Apr. 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/state_aid/studies_reports/2009_spring_en.pdf. 
20. EC DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECON. AND FIN. AFFAIRS, EUR. ECON. NO. 7, 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN EUROPE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES 62 (2009). 
21. TFEU, supra note 13, art. 107(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 91; EC Treaty, supra note 
13, art. 87(1), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 76–77. 
22. See, e.g., France v. Commission (Kimberly Clark), Case 241/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-
3203, ¶ 19. 
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any gratuitous advantage such as a state guarantee of a firm’s 
debt.”23 “State” includes not only central governments but also 
local authorities, regional development agencies, and other 
bodies whose funding comes largely or exclusively from the 
state.24 
Crucially, aid must be selectively applied. General measures 
open to all comparable market players, such as guarantees for all 
retail bank deposits or open market operations and standing 
facilities entered into with or provided by central banks, are not 
selective and do not constitute state aid.25 It is the effect, not the 
purpose of state aid that is decisive.26 
To help identify state aid, the Commission has relied upon 
the principle of the “market economy investor,” according to 
which a transaction involves state aid if it takes place in 
circumstances that would not be acceptable to a private investor 
operating under normal market conditions.27 
The exceptional nature of the market situation in recent 
years and the intention, scope, and beneficiaries of state rescue 
packages might imply that virtually all state rescue measures 
amount to state aid.28 That, not least implied by the 
Commission’s application of the market-economy-investor test in 
cases such as WestLB/Germany. That decision emphasized—
during a period in which banks were criticized for excessive risk 
taking—the prudence of the private investor “whose goal of 
 
23. See EURO. CONFERENCE OF POSTAL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADMINS. 
(CEPT), REFARMING AND SECONDARY TRADING IN A CHANGING RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS 
WORLD 22 (2002); see also Commission Decision No. 25/08, slip op. ¶ 39 (Eur. Comm’n 
Apr. 30, 2008), cited in 2008 O.J. C 189/02 (WestLB/Germany), and Commission Decision 
No. 8/2008, slip op. ¶ 68 (Eur. Comm’n June 4, 2008) (Sachsen LB/Germany). 
24. See, e.g., EC DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION, VADEMECUM: 
COMMUNITY LAW ON STATE AID 6 (2008) [hereinafter VADEMECUM], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/
vademecum_on_rules_09_2008_en.pdf; see also Italy v. Commission (Textiles), Case 
173/73, [1974] E.C.R. 709. 
25. See VEDMECUM, supra note 24, at 6. 
26. See Kimberly Clark, [1996] E.C.R. 1-4551, ¶¶ 19, 20. 
27. See BARRY J. RODGER & ANGUS MACCULLOCH, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN 
THE EC AND U.K. 349 (4th ed. 2009). 
28. See Damien Gerard, EC Competition Law Enforcement at Grips with the Financial 
Crisis: Flexibility on The Means, Consistency in the Principles, in CONCURRENCES, at 46, 48 
(Inst. of Competition L., Issue No. 1, 2009). 
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profit maximization is tempered with caution about the level of 
risk acceptable for a given rate of return.”29 
Yet, the Commission held that no state aid was at stake in 
the case of emergency liquidity assistance provided by the Bank 
of England on its own initiative to Northern Rock.30 Nor did the 
Commission consider that the liquidity facility provided by the 
Danish National Bank of up to kr750 million guaranteed by Det 
Private Beredskab constituted state aid within the meaning of 
article 87(1) EC Treaty (now article 107(1) TFEU).31 In that way, 
the Commission has helped facilitate the administration of 
government rescue packages. 
Perhaps mindful of market volatility, however, it has 
simultaneously confirmed its controversial approach in the 
France Telecom case, according to which the mere 
announcement on the part of public authorities to prevent the 
downgrading of a company’s rating by rating agencies may, when 
coupled with subsequent intervention, constitute state aid.32 
B. Grounds for Approving State Aid in the Financial Crisis 
1. Historical Use of Article 87(3)(c) EC Treaty  
Until relatively recently, the Commission’s approval of state 
aid to failing banks has been based primarily upon article 
87(3)(c) EC Treaty (now article 107(3)(c) TFEU), which permits 
“aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities 
. . . where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to 
an extent contrary to the common interest.”33 
 
29. WestLB/Germany, slip op. ¶ 32. 
30. See Commission Decision No. 70/07, slip. op. ¶ 53 (Eur. Comm’n Dec. 5, 
2007), cited in 2008 O.J. C 43/01 (United Kingdom Rescue Aid to Northern Rock). 
31. See Commission Decision No. 36/08, slip. op. ¶ 65 (Eur. Comm’n July 31, 
2008), cited in 2008 O.J. C 238/02 (Denmark Roskilde Bank A/S). 
32. See Commission Decision No. 2006/621/EC, [2006] O.J. L 257/11, at 45–48, 
¶¶ 206–24 (France Télécom). 
33. TFEU, supra note 13, art. 107(3)(c), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 92; EC Treaty, supra 
note 13, art. 87(3)(c), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 77; see Commission Communication, 2008 
O.J. C 270/2 (Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial 
Institutions in the Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis), at 9 [hereinafter 
Banking Communication] (noting that state aid is normally assessed under article 
107(3)(c) TFEU (article 87(3)(c) EC)). 
  
2010] COMPETITION POLICY IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1677 
The reliance upon the article 87(3)(c) EC Treaty exception 
was indicative of the Commission’s initial perception that cases 
involving State aid to failing banks were not symptomatic of the 
“serious disturbance in the economy” required by article 
87(3)(c) EC Treaty,34 but were rather representative of 
“individual problems, . . . [requiring] tailor made remedies, 
which can be addressed under the rules for companies in 
difficulties.”35 
Those rules are embodied in the Commission’s 
Communication on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring 
Firms in Difficulty (“Rescue and Restructuring Aid 
Guidelines”),36 now supplemented by the Commission’s 
Guidance on the Return of Viability and the Assessment of 
Restructuring Measures in the Financial Sector in the Current 
Crisis under State Aid Rules (“Restructuring Communication”).37 
Rescue aid is available to keep failing firms afloat pending 
restructuring or liquidation.38 It must be warranted on the 
grounds of serious “social” difficulty and constitutes reversible 
liquidity support for up to six months, which must be repaid.39 
Restructuring aid is aid granted with a view to giving 
undertakings long-term viability and must be limited to the 
minimum amount necessary to avoid undue distortions in 
competition.40 
It was within the framework of rescue and restructuring aid 
that Germany notified the Commission of state aid for Sachsen 
LB and West LB, and that the U.K. provided a restructuring aid 
package for Northern Rock. 
 
34. EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 87(3)(c), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 77. 
35. WestLB/Germany, slip op., ¶ 42. 
36. Commission Communication, 2004 O.J. C 244/2 (Community Guidelines on 
State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty) [hereinafter Rescue and 
Restructuring Guidelines]. 
37. Commission Communication 2009 O.J. C 195/04  (on the return to viability 
and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis 
under the State aid rules) [hereinafter Restructuring Communication]. 
38. See Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, supra note 36, 2004 O.J. C 244/2, at 
4. 
39. See id. at 4–5. 
40. See id. at 6. 
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2. Use of Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty as a Legal Basis for Aid 
Measures Addressing the Financial Crisis 
On October 6, 2008, in an address before the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, Neelie 
Kroes made known her intention “not [to] shy away if need be 
from applying the special provisions of Article 87(3)(b) [EC 
Treaty, now article 107(3)(b) TFEU] regarding aid granted to 
address a serious disturbance of the economy of a Member 
State.”41 
That acceptance of article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty as a legal 
basis for aid to even “fundamentally sound” undertakings 
represented a significant shift in policy.42 Prior to the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the Commission had consistently refused to 
authorize measures reliant on the article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty 
exception to the prohibition on state aid, claiming the article 
“needs to be applied restrictively so that aid cannot be benefiting 
only one company or one sector but must tackle a disturbance in 
the entire economy of a Member State.”43 
The Commission’s new-found reliance on that hitherto 
unused provision is an acknowledgment of the exceptional 
economic circumstances in which it is operating—the “serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State” to use the 
language of the article. It is via article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty that 
the Commission issued its approval of rescue packages such as 
the U.K.’s recapitalization of Lloyds TSB/HBOS and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland, the Dutch bail-out package for ING, and the 
Danish rescue scheme for Roskilde Bank. 
While application of article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty gives scope 
for wider application of aid than that permitted by the existing 
Rescue and Restructuring Aid Guidelines, the Commission has 
taken pains to point out that “recourse to Article 87(3)(b) is 
possible not on [an] open-ended basis but only as long as the 
 
41. Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r for Competition Pol’y, Address Before the 
Monetary Affairs Committee, European Parliament: Dealing with the Current Financial 
Crisis 4 (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/498 [hereinafter Kroes, Dealing with 
the Current Financial Crisis]. 
42. Banking Communication, supra note 33, 2008 O.J. C 270, at 8. 
43. WestLB/Germany, slip op. ¶ 41. 
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crisis situation justifies its application.”44 The Commission’s 
willingness to avail itself of the 87(3)(b) EC Treaty exception 
emphasizes the Commission’s reliance on and novel use of the 
existing EC state aid framework, rather than an overt reinvention 
or a relaxation of state aid law. 
C. Commission Guidance 
1. The Banking Communication of October 25, 2008 
The Banking Communication of October 25, 2008 
(“Banking Communication”)45 was the first of four 
communications establishing the framework for the application 
of state aid rules on the basis of article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty. 
According to the then Deputy Director General Herbert 
Ungerer, the Banking Communication was designed to “prevent 
subsidy races between Member States that could undermine 
financial stability at the EU level,”46 while enforcing “necessary 
discipline in assistance to banks.”47 
The Communication covers different types of aid, including 
guarantees of financial institutions’ liabilities, the recapitalization 
of financial institutions (not permitted by the Rescue and 
Restructuring Guidelines), the controlled winding up of financial 
institutions, and the provision by central banks of short-term 
liquidity assistance (which the Commission notes is not state aid 
at all).48 
It draws an important distinction between “illiquid but 
otherwise fundamentally sound financial institutions,” who would 
benefit from a speedy approach and less scrutiny, and those 
whose problems are caused by their own “inefficiency or 
excessive risk-taking,” who will also benefit from the speedier 
approach but will undergo the higher level of scrutiny required 
by the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.49 
 
44. Banking Communication, supra note 33, 2008 O.J. C 270, at 9. 
45. Id. 
46. Ungerer, supra note 12, at 7. 
47. Id. at 6. 
48. See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, LLP, BRIEFING: STATE AID TO 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2 (2008), available at http://www.freshfields.com/
publications/pdfs/2008/oct08/24336.pdf. 
49. Banking Communication, supra note 33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 9–10. 
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It signifies a more flexible approach on behalf of the 
Commission with respect to the application of article 87(3)(b) 
EC Treaty in the banking sector. It contains significant new 
elements: a new timetable for state aid approval, introducing a 
twenty-four-hour or weekend procedure.50 For example, the 
Commission approved the U.K.’s rescue of Bradford & Bingley 
within twenty-four hours, albeit following detailed discussions 
prior to the submission for approval.51 Likewise, Germany’s Hypo 
Real Estate was bailed out with Commission approval within 
three days, after close cooperation between the Commission and 
German authorities;52 a two-year time limit on state aid, with six 
monthly reviews to determine whether the aid remains 
necessary;53 and the targeting of aid. Guarantees covering retail 
deposits (such as that offered by the Irish government)54 are 
generally justifiable to prevent a run on the bank and wholesale 
lending and other guarantees are permissible in certain 
circumstances, particularly if they stimulate the resumption of 
interbank lending);55 and proportionality guidelines for 
guarantees and recapitalization.56 
The Banking Communication also attaches conditions to 
the Commission’s authorization of financial recovery plans and 
individual rescue measures pursuant to article 87(3)(b) EC 
Treaty, such as the prohibition on advertising based on the 
recipient’s state-supported status, or on expansion of business 
using state aid.57 
The Communication requires general recovery plans to 
contain objective and non-discriminatory criteria.58 As one 
scholar noted: 
 
50. See id. at 14. 
51. See Commission Press Release, IP/08/1437 (Oct. 1, 2008), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleaseAction.do?reference=IP/08/1437. 
52. See Commission Press Release, IP/08/1453 (Oct. 2, 2008), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1453 (noting that 
the Commission had received notification of German aid to Hypo Real Estate on Sept. 
30, 2008, three days before the rescue package was approved). 
53. See Banking Communication, supra note 33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 14. 
54. See Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Scheme ¶ 10.1 (2008) (Ir.), available 
at http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications/statutoryinstruments/
2008si4112008.pdf. 
55. See Banking Communication, supra note 33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 10. 
56. See id. at 10 
57. See id. at 11. 
58. See id. at 10, 12. 
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Guarantee and recapitalization plans must be open to all 
credit institutions with systemic relevance to the economy of 
the relevant Member State, regardless of their origin (i.e. 
including subsidiaries and regardless of whether their 
branches are headquartered abroad). Compliance with that 
criterion was the core of discussions between the 
Commission and Ireland during the review of the general 
guarantee scheme for banks in Ireland.59 
The Communication insists that state guarantees be granted 
with adequate remuneration from individual financial 
institutions and/or the financial sector as a whole.60 Indeed, the 
level of remuneration payable to the state was at the core of 
discussions between the Commission and the French government 
in relation to a capital-injection scheme for banks designed to 
stabilize financial markets and incentivize French banks to 
increase lending to the real economy.61 Fees are to be “set 
according to the degree of risk and beneficiaries, respective 
credit profiles and needs.”62 Capital injections are to be 
“provided against properly valued and remunerated securities, 
ideally carrying corresponding rights.”63 Thus, in exchange for its 
bailout of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the U.K. government 
acquired a sixty-eight percent shareholding comprising of 
preferential shares yielding twelve percent interest.64 
Guarantee and recapitalization schemes must be “tied to 
duly monitored behavioural constraints preventing aggressive 
commercial conduct” on the part of beneficiaries. GDP-related, 
market share or balance sheet growth caps might be 
implemented.65 There have also been highly publicized cuts in 
bonuses. For example, the U.K. Bank Recapitalization Scheme 
 
59.  Gerard, supra note 28, at 52; see Commission Decision No. 48/2008, slip op. 
(Eur. Comm’n Oct. 13, 2008), cited in 2008 O.J. C 312/1 (Ir.). 
60. See Gerard, supra note 28, at 53; see also Banking Communication, supra note 
33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 11. 
61. See Commission Press Release, IP/08/1900 (Dec. 8, 2008). 
62. See Gerard, supra note 28, at 53; see also Banking Communication, supra note 
33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 11. 
63. See Gerard, supra note 28, at 53; see also Banking Communication, supra note 
33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 13. 
64. See, e.g., Jill Treanor, Government Takes 68% Stake in Royal Bank of Scotland, 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jan/19/
rbs-second-bailout. 
65. See Gerard, supra note 28, at 53; see also Banking Communication, supra note 
33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 11. 
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requires that no cash bonuses be paid to directors for the current 
year’s performance and provides for the appointment of new 
independent directors.66 “The German scheme includes similar 
behavioural restraints with respect to executive remuneration 
and bonuses,”67 while the French scheme “requires beneficiary 
banks to adopt measures concerning the remuneration of senior 
management and market operators (including traders) and 
limits severance packages for executives.”68 
During the weeks following the publication of the guidance, 
the Commission adopted several decisions, the content of which 
varies widely but all of which are governed by the application of 
article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty as laid down in the Banking 
Communication.  Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Holland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden have 
benefited from remedial schemes and the Commission has 
adopted multiple measures designed for individual financial 
institutions: Roskilde Bank,69 ING,70 Fortis,71 Dexia,72 JSC Parex 
 
66. See, e.g., Citizens Bank Parent Royal Bank of Scotland Rescued, PHIL. BUS. JOURNAL, 
Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/1008/10/13/
daily6.html; see also Gerard, supra note 28, at 53 n.84. 
67. Gerard, supra note 28, at 53 n.84; Commission Press Release, IP/09/711 (May 
7, 2009). 
68. Gerard, supra note 28, at 53 n.84; Commission Press Release, IP/08/1453 (Oct. 
2, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/
1453. 
69. Commission Decision No. 36/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Nov. 5, 2008), cited 
in 2009 O.J. C 12/1 (Roskilde Bank/Denmark). 
70. Commission Decision No. 528/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Nov. 12, 2008), 
cited in 2009 O.J. C 328/7 (ING/Netherlands). 
71. Commission Decision No. 574/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2008), cited 
in 2009 O.J. C 80/7 (Fortis Bank/Belgium). 
72. Commission Decision No. 45/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Mar. 13, 2009), cited 
in 2009 O.J. C 181/42 (Dexia/Luxembourg). 
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Banka,73 Aegon,74 KBC,75 Carnegie Bank,76 BayernLB,77 Nord 
LB,78 and IKB.79 
2. Recapitalization Communication of December 5, 2008 
Supplemental to the Banking Communication, the 
Recapitalization Communication of December 5, 2008 
(“Recapitalization Communication”)80 provides further guidance 
requested by industry. It was introduced in the context of saving 
distressed banks, such as Fortis and Dexia, from difficult market 
conditions and the risk of insolvency.81 
Its broad principles are: to allow for the individual situation 
of each bank to be analyzed;82 to ensure that there are incentives 
for state capital to be redeemed once market conditions have 
returned to normal;83 and to provide behavioral safeguards to 
both limit distortions of competition and to protect taxpayers’ 
money, without which “not only will state intervention not help, 
it will make the situation worse.”84 
Neelie Kroes couches its significance thus: “[W]e have 
moved beyond the need to shore up the banks. Now, financially 
sound banks may need state capital not to survive, but to provide 
 
73. Commission Decision No. 68/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Nov. 24, 2008), cited 
in 2009 O.J. C 147/1 (JSC Parex Banka/Latvia). 
74. Commission Decision No. 569/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Nov. 27, 2008), 
cited in 2009 O.J. C 9/1 (Aegon/Netherlands). 
75. Commission Decision No. 602/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Dec. 18, 2008), 
cited in 2009 O.J. C 109/1 (KBC Group/Belgium). 
76. Commission Decision No. 64/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Dec. 15, 2008), cited 
in 2009 O.J. C 29/1 (Carnegie Bank/Sweden). 
77. Commission Decision No. 615/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Dec. 18, 2008), 
cited in 2009 O.J. C 80/4 (BayernLB/Germany). 
78. Commission Decision No. 655/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Dec. 22, 2008), 
cited in 2009 O.J. C 63/16 (Nord/LB/Germany). 
79. Commission Decision No. 213/2009, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n May 15, 2009), 
cited in 2009 O.J. C 258/1 (IKB/Germany). 
80.  Commission Communication to Member States on the Recapitalisation of 
Financial Institutions in the Current Financial Crisis: Limitation of Aid to the Minimum 
Necessary and Safeguards Against Undue Distortions of Competition, 2009 O.J. C 10/2. 
81. See Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r for Competition Pol’y, Remarks at Press 
Conference: The Role of State Aid in Tackling the Financial & Economic Crisis (Dec. 8, 
2008), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/683 
[hereinafter Role of State Aid]. 
82. See Kroes, EU State Aid Rules, supra note 7. 
83. See id. 
84. Kroes, Role of State Aid, supra note 81. 
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enough loans to companies in the rest of the economy. State 
recapitaliation can be an alternative to de-leveraging the balance 
sheets of the banks.”85 She places the Recapitalization 
Communication within the context of not merely necessary 
financial aid but the preservation of competition policy: 
“[W]henever State aid is used, it is really to serve financial 
stability and not to distort competition.”86 
Following the Recapitalization Communication, the 
Commission adopted the French recapitalization scheme87 and 
approved the Austrian scheme,88 among others. 
3. Temporary Framework Adopted on December 17, 200889 
The new framework introduced “a number of temporary 
measures to allow Member States to address the exceptional 
difficulties of companies to obtain finance.”90 In particular, it 
allows Member States to grant, without notification of individual 
cases, subsidized loans, loan guarantees at a reduced premium, 
risk capital for small and medium enterprises and direct aids of 
up to €500,000, among other things.91 
The framework was intended to facilitate the tackling of the 
current difficulties in the real economy, rather than just the 
financial sector. According to the Commission, its purpose was 
“to ensure sufficient bank lending to companies; secondly, it is to 
allow companies with liquidity problems due to the crisis to 
benefit from temporary relief through a limited grant; and 
thirdly it is to encourage companies to continue investing into a 
sustainable future, including the development of green 
products.”92 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. See Commission Press Release, IP/08/1900 (Dec. 8, 2008). 
88. See Commission Press Release, IP/08/1933 (Dec. 10, 2008). 
89. Commission Communication, Temporary Community Framework for State Aid 
Measures to Support Access to Finance in the Current Financial and Economic Crisis, 
2009 O.J. C 83/01 [hereinafter Temporary Framework]. 
90. Commission Press Release, IP/08/1993 (Dec. 10, 2008). 
91. See id.; see also Temporary Framework, supra note 89, 2009 O.J. C 83/01, at 7–
11. 
92. Commission Press Release, IP/08/1993 (Dec. 13, 2008); see also Temporary 
Framework, supra note 89, 2009 O.J. C 83, at 3. 
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The Temporary Framework does not apply to companies 
whose problems pre-date the current crisis. To that effect, a cut-
off date was introduced in the Temporary Framework—the 
framework can only be applied to firms not in difficulty on July 1, 
2008.93 For firms already in difficulty by that date, the Rescue and 
Restructuring Guidelines remain the most adequate tool to 
restore long-term viability. 
All measures are limited until the end of 2010 and subject to 
conditions. Based on Member States’ reports, the Commission 
will evaluate whether the measures should be maintained beyond 
2010, depending upon whether the crisis continues.94 
Neelie Kroes was keen to emphasize the framework’s 
continuity with previous state aid policy, saying the framework 
was intended to “complement the package already delivered by 
State aid reform in the last three years, to support growth 
through the recession period.”95 
4. Impaired Assets Communication of February 25, 2009 
The Impaired Assets Communication of February 25, 200996 
is part of the temporary framework and supplements the Banking 
and Recapitalization Communications. 
Essentially, it aims to help Member States deal with “toxic 
assets” on banks’ balance sheets. The type of asset scheme will be 
the choice of the Member State.97 It gives Member States the 
option to purchase toxic assets and place them in a “bad bank,” 
to guarantee bad assets on banks’ balances sheets or nationalize 
banks and take control of their assets.98 
The Impaired Assets Communication focuses on the 
rationale for asset relief as a measure to safeguard financial 
stability and underpin bank lending; the longer-term 
considerations of banking-sector viability and budgetary 
sustainability to be taken into account when considering asset 
 
93. See Temporary Framework, supra note 89, 2009 O.J. C 83/01, at 7. 
94. See id. at 7. 
95. Kroes, Role of State Aid, supra note 81. 
96. Commission Communication on the treatment of impaired assets in the 
Community banking sector, 2009 O.J. C 72/01, at 1 [hereinafter Impaired Assets 
Communication]. 
97. Id. at 13. 
98. Id. at 1. 
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relief measures; and the need for a common and co-ordinated 
Community approach to asset relief, notably to ensure a level 
playing field.99 
Following the Communications, the Commission approved 
the recapitalization of Commerzbank100 and WestLB,101 and 
opened in-depth investigations on a number of other financial 
institutions.102 
5. Simplification Package of April 16, 2009 
The Simplification Package of April 29, 2009 
(“Simplification Package”)103 was “the missing link in the 
implementation of the State Aid Action Plan”104 announced in 
2005. The package is composed of the Best Practices Code and 
the Notice on Simplified Procedure.105 It represents the 
Commission’s attempt to accelerate its approval of state aid 
packages and improve credibility, predictability, and 
transparency with respect to its state aid procedure.106 The aim is 
to ensure that clearly compatible aid gets approved within one 
month when Member States provide a complete notification.107 
The Best Practices Code details how state-aid procedures 
should be carried out in practice and applies to all cases not 
covered by the General Block Exemption Regulation or subject 
to the Notice on Simplified Procedure.108 It includes 
arrangements regarding prenotification,109 mutually agreed 
planning,110 and the treatment of complaints.111 The code 
 
99. Id. at 1 
100. Commission Press Release, IP/09/711 (May 7, 2009). 
101. See Commission Press Release, IP/09/741 (May 12, 2009). 
102. See, e.g., EC State Aid Register, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
register/ii/by_date_2009_05.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) (listing EU decisions on 
state aid to Member States). 
103. See Commission Notice, 2009 O.J. C 136/03 (On a Simplified Procedure for 
Treatment of Certain Types of State Aid) [hereinafter Notice on Simplified Procedure]; 
Commission Communication, 2009 O.J. C 136/04 (Code of Best Practice for the 
Conduct of State Aid Control Procedures) [hereinafter Code of Best Practice]. 
104. Ungerer, supra note 12. 
105. See Notice on Simplified Procedure, supra note 103, 2009 O.J. C 136/03; Code 
of Best Practice, supra note 103, 2009 O.J. C 136/04. 
106. See Notice on Simplified Procedure, supra note 103, 2009 O.J. C 136/03, at 3. 
107. See Code of Best Practice, supra note 103, 2009 O.J. C 136/04, at 17. 
108. See Commission Press Release, IP/09/659 (Apr. 29, 2009). 
109. See Code of Best Practice, supra note 103. 
110. See id. at 15–16. 
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includes a certain number of voluntary arrangements between 
the Commission and Member States to achieve more streamlined 
and predictable procedures at each step of a state-aid 
investigation.112 With respect to prenotification, for example, the 
Commission will offer informal guidance, written guidance, and 
a preliminary assessment of the case if a Member State requests 
it.113 Member States are also encouraged to respond more 
promptly to the requests made by the Commission; if a Member 
State fails to respond after one reminder, the notification will be 
automatically withdrawn.114 
The Simplified Package aims at improving the Commission’s 
treatment of straightforward cases, like those clearly in line with 
existing horizontal instruments or established Commission 
decision-making practice. The notice includes an illustrative list 
of aid measures, including certain aids for small- and medium- 
sized enterprises (“SMEs”), environmental aid, innovation aid 
and rescue and restructuring aid, which are in principle suitable 
for simplified treatment.115 It is an enlargement of the category of 
measures that do not need to be notified in advance to the 
Commission. Such measures will be subject to ex post 
monitoring.116 
Those procedures may help ameliorate any concerns of 
business and governments about the efficiency of the 
Commission’s approval of State aid packages. The Commission 
does, however, view the success of the initiative as dependent 
upon the cooperation of Member States.117 
6. Restructuring Communication of August 19, 2009 
The Restructuring Communication of August 19, 2009 
(“Restructuring Communication”)118 aims to make banks viable 
in the long term without further state support, to ensure that 
aided banks and their owners take responsibility for their past 
 
111. See id. at 19–20. 
112. See id. at 20. 
113. See id. at 15. 
114. See id. at 16. 
115. See Notice on Simplified Procedure, supra note 103, 2009 O.J. C 136/03, at 5. 
116. See Ungerer, supra note 12, at 16–17. 
117. See id. at 14; see also Notice on Simplified Procedure, supra note 103, 2009 O.J. 
C 136/03, at 3. 
118. Restructuring Communication, supra note 37, 2009 O.J. C 195/04. 
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behavior and help bear the cost of restructuring, and to limit 
distortions of competition in the EU single market.119 
Banks that have received large amounts of aid and that have 
unsustainable business models are required to demonstrate 
strategies to achieve long-term viability under adverse economic 
conditions;120 restructuring should put banks in a position to 
cover their costs and provide an appropriate return on equity 
without recourse to state funding.121 To ensure the proposal is 
robust, banks will “stress test” their business, diagnosing its 
strengths and weaknesses.122 
Restrictions and greater scrutiny apply to banks undertaking 
a restructuring program, with respect to the amount of aid, the 
payment of dividends and the reduction of capital and growth.123 
The communication envisages and aims to prevent scenarios of 
market distortion arising from state aid: aid may reinforce the 
market position of the aid recipient relative to that of its unaided 
competitors, help perpetuate failed business models, reduce the 
incentive to compete and create moral hazard by encouraging 
excessive risk-taking.124 Banks will be prohibited from using state 
aid to acquire competing businesses except under exceptional 
circumstances, from making offers on terms that an unaided 
competitor cannot match, and from using state aid as a 
competitive advantage in marketing financial offers.125 
The restructuring measures the guidance contemplates have 
led to forced divestments of assets and may radically reshape the 
banks subject to them and the financial landscape in which they 
operate.126 On November 18, 2009, the Commission announced 
its approval of the Lloyds Banking Group restructuring plan, 
which includes the divestment of Lloyds Banking Group’s core 
business of U.K. retail banking to remove distortions created by 
 
119. See Commission Press Release, IP/09/1180 (July 23, 2009). 
120. See Restructuring Communication, supra note 37, 2009 O.J. C 195/04, at 9. 
121. See id. at 11. 
122. See id. at 10. 
123. See id. at 13; see also, Alison Berridge & Mark Friend, Editorial, New European 
Guidelines on Bank Restructuring, ALLEN & OVERY AREAS OF EXPERTISE ANTITRUST AND EU 
(July 27, 2009), http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/AreasOfExpertise/
Editorial.aspx?contentTypeID=1&contentSubTypeID=7944&itemID=54063. 
124. See Restructuring Communication, supra note 37, 2009 O.J. C 195/04, at 14. 
125. See id. at 16. 
126. See e.g., Commission Press Release, IP/09/1728 (Nov. 18, 2009) (describing 
the restructuring plan for Lloyds Banking Group, including a divestment package). 
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aid granted in and since January 2009.127 The Commission thus 
countered criticism that its recent endeavors have undermined 
the law and purpose of article 87 of the EC Treaty (now TFEU 
article 107). 
In a change to past practice, however, the guidelines allow 
up to five years for the completion of restructuring, rather than 
the two or three years previously applied, offering more flexibility 
to banks and arguably allowing for natural market recovery.128 
Nor has the Commission specified the minimum level of 
contribution by a bank to its restructuring; in the past, large firms 
have been required to fund at least fifty percent of restructuring 
costs,129 but the Commission has stated that it may accept lower 
levels in the current circumstances.130 It has also indicated that it 
may approve aid packages to the same recipient, a suspension of 
its previous “one last time” rule.131 This shift will be important in 
the context of ratings; agencies take into account what would 
happen in the event of failure—including the prospect of a bail-
out—and confirmation that this option is still available may help 
secure better ratings for affected banks. 
D. Characterization of the Commission’s Approach to State Aid 
Neelie Kroes claims she is “the first to concede that these 
exceptional times are making new demands on the state aid 
system.”132 The Commission has attempted to find a middle way 
between states clamoring for the power to rescue their most 
important financial institutions and legal purists decrying an 
apparent chasm between the existing state aid rules and the 
practice of the Commission. 
To some extent it has succeeded. If nothing else, the 
Commission’s abundance of guidelines has promoted some legal 
certainty and governmental restraint at a time when the world 
economy and government’s attitude to state aid are in flux. Its 
guidance can help reassure the markets that the Commission is 
 
127. See id. at 2. 
128. See Restructuring Communication, supra note 37, 2009 O.J. C 195/04, at 12. 
129. See Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, supra note 36, 2004 O.J. C 244/02, 
at 8. 
130. See Commission Press Release, MEMO/09/350 (July 23, 2009), at 2. 
131. Id. 
132. Kroes, EU State Aid Rules, supra note 7, at 2. 
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promoting compliance with general EU single market principles. 
In that way, the evident evolution of state aid law and the 
Commission’s ever-expanding policy and portfolio of decisions 
has helped preserve “the possibility and legitimacy of the 
Commission’s involvement into the management of the crisis.”133 
After all, the Commission’s job, in part, has been to appease 
Member States anxious to offer substantial rescue packages to 
their failing institutions. The Commission has adopted an 
attitude of cooperation: “[W]e are a partner, not an obstacle. We 
are engaged in a pro-active process, to help Member States 
design their State aid schemes for banks in the best way.”134 
That may seem a far cry from the rhetoric of article 87(1) 
EC Treaty (now article 107(1) TFEU).135 The premise of its 
intervention has been saving the system, rather than individual 
firms.136 Moreover, the Commission has subjected the recipients 
of state guarantees and recapitalizations under the Banking 
Communication to limitations on their future commercial 
behavior.137 They are constrained by bans on advertising based 
on their state-supported status, as well as by restrictions on 
pricing, bonuses for management, and expansion of the business 
through a market share cap and limitations on the size of their 
balance sheets.138 For example, the bail-out recapitalization 
schemes involving Lloyds TSB/HBOS and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland required the recipients to restore lending to pre-credit-
crunch levels and senior managers were obliged to forgo cash 
bonuses.139 
Through the use of the article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty exception 
to the state aid prohibition140 and the adoption of the Temporary 
Framework, which allows for approval of state aid measures 
 
133. Gerard, supra note 28, at 47. 
134. Kroes, Role of State Aid, supra note 81, at 3. 
135. TFEU, supra note 13, art. 107(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 91; EC Treaty, supra note 
13, art. 87(1), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 76. 
136. See Banking Communication, supra note 33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 8–9. 
137. See id. at 11–12; see also da Silva & Sansom, supra note 4, at 29. 
138. See Banking Communication, supra note 33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 11–12; see 
also da Silva & Sansom, supra note 4, at 29. 
139. See Jon Menon, RBS, HBOs, Lloyds Get 37 Billion-Pound U.K. Bailout, 
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aT9SRmp1jvxE&refer=home. 
140. TFEU, supra note 13, art. 107(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 91. 
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within twenty-four hours,141 the Commission has attempted to 
respond to criticism from those with a penchant for the 
protectionist measures of the Great Depression. In so doing, it is 
possible that “[t]he pragmatism and flexibility shown by the 
Commission in adjusting its approach to fit the circumstances 
may well have avoided a more serious undermining of State aid 
antitrust law through widespread non-compliance.”142 The 
Commission has also been firm with those refusing to follow state 
aid rules and decisions, as evidenced by the referral of Poland to 
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) for their failure to recover 
illegal aid from Technologie Buczek.143 Neelie Kroes commented 
in respect to that decision: “The Commission will continue to 
take a strong stance against Member States that do not recover 
State aid from companies who received unfair and illegal 
support.”144 
Yet some argue that the long-term effects of vast quantities 
of authorized state aid may prove more problematic than the 
robust rhetoric of the Commission would suggest. For example, 
where bail-outs are sector-wide, as they were in Ireland’s 
guarantee of retail deposits,145 and recipients of state aid are 
required to submit to market share caps as a result, it could affect 
the operation of competition in that market or lead to an 
increased risk of coordination between banks. According to da 
Silva and Sansom, “in-depth Commission scrutiny [of state aid] is 
merely postponed.”146 In short, such commentators argue, the 
Commission has rendered itself partly culpable for costly bailout 
packages, the effects of which remain to be seen and the scrutiny 
of which the Commission has seemed happy to defer: “the 
medicine may be more harmful than the illness.”147 It is perhaps 
difficult to see how the multitude of hastily authorized aid 
packages will avoid the pitfalls originally envisaged by the drafters 
of article 107(3)(b) TFEU. There is a risk in adopting a more 
flexible procedure that the new regime may not prove as robust 
 
141. See Banking Communication, supra note 33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 14. 
142. See da Silva & Sansom, supra note 4, at 32. 
143. See Commission Press Release, IP/09/777 (May 14, 2009). 
144. Id. 
145. See Commission Decision No. 48/2008, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Oct. 13, 2008), 
cited in 2008 O.J. C 312/01 [hereinafter Guarantee Scheme for Banks of Ireland]. 
146. da Silva & Sansom, supra note 4, at 29. 
147. Id. at 30. 
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as the original.148 Less time inevitably means less scrutiny and the 
mechanics of enforcing safeguards, such as behavioral 
restrictions, are yet to be fully defined. 
The Commission’s reliance on the article 87(3)(b) EC 
Treaty exception, however, is instructive. The Commission rightly 
views the current economic crisis as exceptional and profound. 
The language of article 87 EC Treaty itself makes provision for 
the approval of aid in such circumstances. Importantly, the 
Commission envisages its guidelines as temporary measures, 
placing deadlines on the applicability of its communications and 
the state-aid framework.149 The degree to which the Commission 
enforces the Restructuring Guidelines—its insistence on a return 
to long-term viability for the recipients of state aid150— will be the 
decisive test of the Commission’s framework. If successful, it will 
answer criticism that the new regime is an irreversible departure 
from the old and one which irrevocably damages competition 
law. It therefore remains to be seen whether the Commission can 
justifiably lay claim to the role of protector of the EU single 
market—the EU’s “crown jewel”151—and quash the suggestion 
that “antitrust enforcement is a political luxury good consumed 
during times of relative peace and prosperity.”152 
II. MERGERS 
A. The European Response 
The initial stages of the crisis were characterized by 
divergent actions by the Member States struggling to support 
their own markets.153 The need for a coordinated response was 
very real, and this was recognized early on by Neelie Kroes.154 It 
 
148. For further discussion on that point, see Paris Anestis & Sarah Jordan, The 
Handling of State Aid During the Financial Crisis: an Efficient Response or Trouble for the 
Future?, EUR. ANTITRUST REV. (2010). 
149. See Banking Communication, supra note 33, 2008 O.J. C 270/2, at 8, 11, 12. 
150. See id. at 12. 
151. Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r for Competition Pol’y, Speech at the “Sky Talks” 
Conference: Working Together to Clear up the Banking Mess (May 26, 2009). 
152. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Enforcement During National Crises: An Unhappy 
History, GLOBAL COMPETITION POL’Y, Dec. 2008, at 9. 
153. See da Silva & Sansom, supra note 4, at 31. 
154. “[C]ompetition authorities and central banks cannot afford to operate in 
their own little worlds—we must work together on issues like bank recapitalisations and 
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was acknowledged that, left to their own devices, the Member 
States would most likely implement policies that could jeopardize 
the single market.155 
A coordinated response emerged in October 2008 with the 
Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan of the Euro 
Area Countries,156 which outlined the role of the Commission to 
maintain a level playing field between member States and avoid 
the export of financial problems from one Member State to 
another.157 
Under Modernization Regulation 1/2003,158 enforcement of 
articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty (now articles 101 and 102 TFEU) is 
shared between the Commission, the national competition 
authorities (“NCAs”) of the Member States, and the national 
courts. However, the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over 
mergers falling within the EC Merger Regulation (“ECMR”),159 
and the control of state aid. 
 
restructures.” Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r for Competition Pol’y, Speech at the 
Bundeskartellamt Conference on Dominant Companies—The Thin Line Between 
Regulation and Competition Law: The Interface Between Regulation and Competition 
Law, (Apr. 28, 2009), at 3. 
155. “EU competition policy provides an objective, adaptable and comprehensive 
framework. It therefore helps us avoid the potential chaos resulting from each country 
doing their own thing, without regard for negative spillovers affecting others.” Neelie 
Kroes, In Defence of Competition Policy: Opening remarks at Conference “Competition 
Policy, Growth and Consumer Purchasing Power”(Oct. 13, 2008), at 2. 
156. “In the current exceptional circumstances, we stress the need for the 
Commission to continue to act quickly and apply flexibility in state aid decisions, 
continuing to uphold the principles of the single market and of the state aid regime.” 
Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan of the Euro Area Countries, ¶ 5, 
Summit of the Euro Area Countries, Oct. 12, 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/publications/publication13260_en.pdf. 
157. "[A role of the Commission has been to] maintain a level playing field and to 
make sure that national measures would not simply export problems to other Member 
States. The crisis has actually demonstrated that this risk is very tangible, with money 
flowing to banks benefiting from guarantees and leaving other banks in trouble.” 
Commission Press Release, MEMO/08/757 (Dec. 2, 2008) (providing full text of Neelie 
Kroes’s remarks to EU Economics and Finance Ministers at a breakfast discussion on the 
financial crisis). 
158. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, 2003 O.J. L 1/1 [hereinafter Modernization 
Regulation 1/2003]. 
159. See Commission Regulation No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, 2004 O.J. L 24/1 (EC Merger Regulation (“ECMR”)). The ECMR 
repealed and replaced Commission Regulation No. 4064/1989, 1989 O.J. L 395/1, 
corrected version in 1990 O.J. L 257/13, amended by 1997 O.J. L 180/1. See 
Commission Regulation No. 139/2004, art. 25, 2004 O.J. L 24/1. 
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Thus far the Commission has managed to be consistent with 
the established rules of competition law and procedure while 
allowing some flexibility in their application in light of the 
financial climate. It has echoed the sentiments of Peter Freeman, 
Chairman of the U.K. Competition Commission (“CC”), who 
insisted that “competition is just as important in difficult 
economic times as it is in the good times”160 and has endeavored 
to act as a “stabilising force throughout this crisis.”161 According 
to Charlie McCreevy, the European Commissioner for Internal 
Market and Services, 
The crisis has required substantial state intervention in 
financial institutions in many Member States and in this 
regard I don’t think anyone could argue that the 
Commission was anything other than vigorous and efficient 
in applying EU law, notably on competition and state aids, 
but doing so in a way that was flexible and rapid—which was 
essential to maintain confidence in the banking system and 
prevent the crystallization of systemic risks.162 
B. State of the Market 
The second half of 2008 saw a marked reduction in the 
number of mergers notified to the Commission—only 347 cases, 
as compared to the 402 in 2007.163 The same trend continued in 
2009, which ended with only 259 notifications to the 
Commission.164 
At the end of 2008, the total volume of worldwide mergers 
and acquisitions reached US$3.28 billion (of which nineteen 
percent were financial deals), down twenty-nine percent from 
2007.165 The value of cancelled merger deals for the fourth 
quarter in 2008 was nearly the same as the value of deals actually 
 
160. See Freeman, supra note 1, at 1. 
161. Kroes, Dealing with the Current Financial Crisis, supra note 41, at 4. 
162. Charlie McCreevy, Eur. Comm’r for Internal Market and Services, Remarks at 
the 7th Annual Financial Services Conference: Financial Markets and Economic 
Recovery—Restoring Confidence and Responding to Public Concerns (Jan. 27, 2009). 
163. See EUR. COMM’N, COMPETITIVE MERGER CASE STATISTICS FROM SEPTEMBER 21, 
1990 TO FEBRUARY 28, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf 
[hereinafter COMPETITIVE MERGER CASE STATISTICS]. 
164. See id. 
165. See Lina Saigol, Record Number of M&A Deals Cancelled in 2008, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 
22, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d322de98-d056-11dd-ae00-000077b07658.html. 
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completed, with the rate of deals collapsing gathering pace from 
September 2008.166 In total, 1309 transactions valued at US$911 
billion were abandoned. In 2007 the figure was 870 transactions 
valued at US$1.6 billion.167 
One headline-grabbing example was the planned US$6.5 
billion takeover of U.S. chemicals manufacturer Huntsman by 
Hexion Speciality Chemicals (owned by buy-out firm Apollo 
Management), which was abandoned on December 15, 2008.168 
The chief executive of Huntsman said, “Selling a business is not 
easy, and in today’s market it’s darn near impossible.”169 In fact, 
Huntsman went on to sue, and settle with, Credit Suisse and 
Deutsche Bank—the banks that had agreed to finance the deal—
claiming that the banks had conspired with Apollo and 
interfered with Huntsman’s previous merger deal with Basell.170 
BHP Billiton also abandoned its year-long pursuit of mining 
rival Rio Tinto in November 2008.171 The deal, valued at about 
US$140 billion, would have been the biggest takeover seen in the 
mining sector, and the second largest corporate takeover ever.172 
Although the financing was reportedly in place, BHP Billiton’s 
CEO said, that it would not be a good time to take on the level of 
debt that existed on Rio Tintos balance sheet.173 Further, the 
Commission had conducted an initial market investigation into 
the transaction and had reportedly raised concerns over the iron 
ore business.174 It was reported that BHP would have struggled to 
 
166. See Heidi N. Moore, Postmortem: Nearly as Many Cancelled Mergers as New Ones, 
WSJ BLOG: DEAL JOURNAL, Dec. 1, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/12/01/
postmortem-nearly-as-many-cancelled-mergers-as-new-ones/tab/article. 
167. See Saigol, supra note 165. 
168. See Julie MacIntosh, A Match Made in Recession, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 
2008, at 14. 
169. See id. 
170. See Martin Arnold, D[eutsche] Bank and Credit Suisse in Huntsman Settlement, FIN. 
TIMES (London), June 24, 2009, at 19. 
171. See Rebecca Bream & Peter Smith, Credit Crunch Forces BHP to Drop Rio Bid, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 26, 2008, at 1. 
172. See id.; see also Rio Tinto Rejects Takeover Bid from BHP Billiton to Create Mining 
Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/08/business/
worldbusiness/08iht-mine.8247508.html. 
173. Press Release, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto Offers No Longer in the Best Interests 
of BHP Billiton Shareholders (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.bhpbillitone.com/bb/
investorsMedia/news/2008/
rioTintoOffersNoLongerInTheBestInterestsOfBhpBillitonShareholders.jsp. 
174. See id. 
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complete any divestments of iron ore mines had they been 
required to by the Commission.175 
Although there may be fewer mergers, the transactions that 
do go ahead are likely to throw up more challenging competition 
issues. But companies should not think that the Commission will 
subject them to less scrutiny in an attempt to boost transaction 
activity, as the Commission has confirmed: “[Y]ou will not see us 
offering special treatment to companies who view a merger as a 
quick-fix to their problems. . . . [W]e have no interest in allowing 
the creation of yet more companies that are ‘too big to fail.’”176 
The Commission has, however, shown some flexibility in 
procedure, if not in substance, clearing deals in record time. 
Although many of the headline-grabbing mergers born of the 
financial crisis have not fallen within the Commission’s 
jurisdiction, it is likely that consolidation across all industries in 
the coming months and years will change that situation. It 
therefore remains to be seen how flexible the Commission will 
be. 
C. The EC Merger Regulation (ECMR) 
The merger control regime in the EU is contained within 
Regulation 139/2004 (“ECMR”)177 and Regulation 802/2004178 
(“Implementing Regulation”). Since the ECMR was introduced 
in 1989, 4317 cases have been notified.179 
The purpose of the ECMR is to catch transactions that will 
lead to a long-term structural change in the European market. 
Transactions must only be notified if there is a “concentration” 
(i.e., a merger or the creation of a joint venture).180 The 
concentration must involve acquisition of control.181 “Control” is 
defined as the ability to exercise a decisive influence on a 
 
175. See id. 
176. Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r for Competition Pol’y, Address at Deutsche Bank 
Conference: Time for Banks to Shoulder Their Responsibilities, (Mar. 14, 2009), at 5. 
177. Commission Regulation No. 139/2004 (ECMR), 2004 O.J. L 24/1. 
178. Commission Regulation No. 802/2004 (Implementing Regulation), 2004 O.J. L 
133/1 (implementing Council Regulation No. 139/2004), amended by 2008 O.J. L 
279/3. 
179. See COMPETITIVE MERGER CASE STATISTICS, supra note 163. 
180. See ECMR, arts. 3, 4, 2004 O.J. L 24/1, at 7–8. 
181. See id. art. 3(1), at 7. 
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company,182 i.e., the power to determine the business and 
commercial decisions of a company or the power to block/veto 
its strategic decisions. 
Such a concentration only falls within the ECMR if it has a 
“Community” dimension.183 The basic thresholds that determine 
whether a transaction has a “Community” dimension are: 
combined worldwide turnover of over €5 billion;184 and 
Community-wide turnover of each of at least two undertakings of 
over €250 million.185 
If those thresholds are satisfied, a notification must be made 
to the Commission prior to implementation of the transaction.186 
It will not be necessary to file in any other jurisdictions in the EU, 
because the idea is for the ECMR to allow for a “one-stop-shop” 
for notification.187 The basic thresholds may not always ensure 
that the most appropriate authority reviews the transaction.188 
Therefore, mergers with a significant cross-border impact but 
subject to national controls can be transferred to the 
Commission;189 cases whose impact is primarily national or local 
but which fall under the new ECMR can be reallocated to the 
NCAs. 
Further, there are a set of supplemental thresholds that 
apply if the basic thresholds are not met. If any of these are not 
satisfied then the merger is notified to national competition 
authorities only: combined worldwide turnover of €2.5 billion;190 
or Community-wide turnover of each of at least two undertakings 
exceeds €100 million;191 or combined turnover of all 
undertakings exceeds €100 million in each of three Member 
States;192 or in each of those three Member States at least two 
 
182. See id. art. 3(2), at 7. 
183. See id. art. 1(1), at 6. 
184. See id. art. 1(2), at 6. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. art. 4(1), at 8. 
187. See id. pmbl. ¶ 8, at 2. 
188. See Commission Notice, 2005 O.J. C 56/2, at 6, (on case referrals in respect of 
concentrations). 
189. See id. art. 4, at 8–9. 
190. See ECMR, art. 1(3)(a), at 6. 
191. See id. art. 1(3)(d). 
192. See id. art. 1(3)(b). 
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undertakings concerned each have turnover exceeding €25 
million.193 
Finally, even if either the basic or supplemental thresholds 
are satisfied the merger will not be notifiable to the Commission 
if the “two-thirds rule” is satisfied, that is if each of the 
undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its 
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same 
Member State.194 
The consolidations in the banking sector that have been 
making headlines since the crisis began have, for the most part, 
not satisfied those thresholds and have therefore been reviewed 
at a national level.195 
D. Commission Merger Decisions in the Financial Crisis 
Relatively few transactions arising out of the financial crisis 
have come within the Commission’s jurisdiction, as the majority 
have not been cross-border but rather have been national in 
scope.196 The Commission has, however, emphasized that the 
ECMR has sufficient flexibility to cope with the crisis.197 
Moreover, the Commission recognizes that certain types of 
mergers are likely to be on the horizon, and has pledged not to 
unnecessarily stand in their way but rather to ensure that “cross-
border acquisitions are not stopped for non-competition reasons 
during the phase of consolidation that the financial sector will 
likely enter in the coming years.”198 
These statements indicate that, in times of crisis, the 
Commission will apply the established rules flexibly and with an 
awareness of the financial situation. That has been tested in the 
 
193. See id. art. 1(3)(c), at 6. 
194. See SLAUGHTER & MAY, THE EC MERGER REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
EU MERGER CONTROL RULES 5 (2006). 
195. See Gerard, supra note 28, at 55. 
196. See id. 
197. “The Merger Regulation will be able to handle anything thrown at it in 2009. 
There may be difficult decisions, but we have the flexibility we need to take account of 
changing market circumstances.” Kroes, Many Achievements, More to Do, supra note 
10. 
198. Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm’r for Competition Pol’y, Speech at ECB-DNB Retail 
Payments Conference: Competition and Regulation in Retail Banking and Payment 
Markets, (May 25, 2009). 
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four cases relating directly to the financial crisis that have thus far 
been assessed by the Commission. 
1. Santander/Alliance & Leicester199 
The deal was announced on July 14, 2008,200 notified to the 
Commission on August 8, 2008, and cleared on September 15, 
2008.201 It stated: 
The proposed transaction, organised in the form of a 
scheme of arrangement and exchange of shares, combined 
the sixth and the eighth largest banks in the UK. The main 
business areas in which the activities of the parties 
overlapped were retail banking, banking for corporate 
customers, factoring, payment cards, financial market 
services and insurance. However, in all these activities the 
market shares were below 15% and would face competition 
from several UK banks (such as Barclays, HBOS, HSBC, 
Lloyds, Nationwide and RBS/NatWest). In addition, Alliance 
& Leicester is present in cash handling and cash sales, 
markets in which Banco Santander is not active but which 
would create vertical relationships post-merger. However, 
given the market structure and the limited market shares of 
Alliance & Leicester, the Commission did not find that the 
transaction would have a significant impact on these markets 
and therefore concluded that the transaction did not give 
rise to competition concerns.202 
2. BNP Paribas/Fortis203 
The Commission cleared the acquisition of the Belgian and 
Luxembourg subsidiaries of Fortis (Fortis Bank Belgium, Fortis 
Banque Luxembourg, and Fortis Insurance Belgium) by BNP 
Paribas.204 The deal was announced on October 6, 2008,205 
 
199. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5293, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Sept. 16, 
2008), cited in 2009 O.J. C 26/3, at 8 (Santander/Alliance & Leicester). 
200. See Santander Agrees £1.2bn A&L Deal, BBC, July 14, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7504822.stm.   
201. See Santander/Alliance & Leicester, slip op. ¶¶ 1, 2. 
202. Commission Press Release, IP/08/1325 (Sept. 16, 2008). 
203. Commission Decision, No. COMP/M.5384, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Dec. 3, 
2008) cited in 2009 O.J. C 7/05 (BNP Paribas/Fortis). 
204. See Mary Loughran & John Gatti, Merger Control: Main Developments Between 1 
September and 31 December 2008, COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL. (Eur. Comm’n Competition 
Directorate-General, Luxembourg) (Jan. 2009), at 67. 
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notified to the Commission on October 29, 2008, and cleared by 
December 3, 2008.206 The clearance was conditional on full 
divestment of BNP Paribas Personal Finance Belgium SA/NV.207 
The Commission’s concerns centered on credit cards as a 
payment instrument as well as on the provision of consumer 
credit.208 Neelie Kroes commented: “This decision is a perfect 
example of the Commission’s ability to reconcile a rapid 
response to the credit crisis with the need to ensure that 
competition law plays its role in the defence of legitimate 
consumer interests.”209 
3. Santander/Bradford & Bingley Assets210 
Upon the collapse and nationalization of U.K. mortgage 
lender Bradford & Bingley, its deposit book and associated assets 
were sold to the Santander Group.211 The deal was announced on 
September 29, 2008,212 notified to the Commission on November 
12, 2008, and cleared on December 17, 2008.213 After examining 
the operation, the European Commission cleared the 
acquisition. “Abbey acquired all retail savings account deposits 
held by Bradford & Bingley together with the agencies and other 
essential assets for the operation of the business. Some remaining 
assets of Bradford & Bingley, in particular the past mortgage 
lending activities, have been transferred to the state.”214 
The Commission’s December 18, 2008 press release stated: 
“Since Bradford & Bingley did not provide a full range of retail 
banking services prior to the merger, the acquisition is unlikely 
 
205. See Nelson D. Shwartz, BNP Paribas to Buy Parts of Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/10/07/business/worldbusiness/07bnp.html. 
206. See BNP Paribas/Fortis, slip op. ¶¶ 1, 161. 
207. See Loughran & Gatti, supra note 204, at 67. 
208. See id. 
209. Commission Press Release, IP/08/1882 (Dec. 3, 2008). 
210. See Commission Decision, No. COMP/M.5363, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Dec. 18, 
2008) cited in 2009 O.J. C 7/04 (Santander/Bradford & Bingley). 
211. See Commission Press Release, IP/08/2012 (Dec. 18, 2008). 
212. See Poppy Trowbridge & Ben Livesey, Bradford & Bingley is Seized; Santander 
Buys Branches, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 29. 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aTBJa4IvamJc&refer=home. 
213. See Santander/Bradford & Bingley, slip op. ¶¶ 1, 37. 
214.  Commission Press Release, IP/08/2012 (Dec. 18, 2008). 
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to have a significant impact on the overall position of Abbey in 
retail banking.”215 
In addition, the press release stated: 
However, since Bradford & Bingley was active in mortgage 
lending, the Commission considered in particular the 
mortgage market more specifically. The Commission based 
its analysis on the assumption that the transferred assets 
would be sufficient to recreate the pre-merger business of 
Bradford & Bingley if Abbey so wished. The savings accounts 
are directly transferred, whereas the customer relations and 
deposit base might allow Abbey to further build its book of 
mortgage business at a similar rate to that of Bradford & 
Bingley in the past. However, even on this assumption, the 
market shares of the merged entity on the UK mortgage 
market would remain below 20%, with a relatively small 
increment resulting from the merger. Moreover, Abbey will 
continue to face a number of competitors on this market. 
Therefore, the Commission concluded that the transaction 
would not raise competition concerns.216 
4. Hypo Real Estate 
On May 15, 2009, the Commission approved the acquisition 
of the German financial institution Hypo Real Estate AG 
(“HRE”) by Germany’s state-owned Financial Market 
Stabilization Fund (“SoFFin”).217 This was the first time in the 
financial crisis that a bank nationalization had been notified to 
the Commission under the ECMR.218 
The transaction was notifiable because HRE and the 
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (“KfW”), another state-controlled 
undertaking, would both be within the control of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance after the transaction.219 SoFFin was created in 
October 2008 “with a view to acting as a vehicle for state 
interventions.”220 HRE is a German financial institution mainly 
active in commercial real estate financing, public sector 
 
215. See id. 
216. Id. 
217. See Commission Press Release, IP/09/791 (May 15, 2009). 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. 
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financing as well as capital markets and asset management.221 
Because HRE would not be operated as a separate commercial 
entity after the acquisition, and the turnover thresholds under 
the ECMR were met, the transaction fell within the Commission’s 
jurisdiction.222 The Commission “assessed the horizontal overlaps 
between HRE and KfW and concluded that there would be only a 
negligible impact on competition.”223 
The Commission’s merger assessment is separate from the 
investigation into the state aid measures put in place to support 
HRE. 
It is notable that all four of these transactions were cleared 
in roughly four weeks, which demonstrates the Commission’s 
commitment to acting quickly on mergers arising out of the 
financial crisis. However, all four mergers were in the financial 
services sector. Given the role that such institutions play in the 
stability of the economy, the Commission needed to act fast. The 
real test of the Commission’s flexibility will come when the wave 
of consolidation spreads beyond financial services, when the 
sense of emergency is not as acute. 
E. ECMR Exemptions for Emergency Transactions 
Even before the current crisis unraveled, legislators were 
aware of the need to accommodate the specific circumstances 
that accompany emergency transactions. The ECMR provides for 
three exemptions that might apply to investments in or 
acquisitions of distressed entities and it is likely that more 
companies will present these arguments to the Commission. 
These exemptions are an example of the in-built flexibility of the 
European system. 
1. Acquisition with a View to Resale 
Article 3(5)(a) of the ECMR exempts the acquisition of 
securities by credit institutions or other financial institutions or 
insurance companies in the ordinary course of business, where 
such securities are held on a temporary basis with a view to resale, 
provided that: the acquiring institution does not exercise voting 
 
221. See id. 
222. See id. 
223. Id. 
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rights in respect of those securities with a view to determining the 
competitive behavior of that undertaking; or the acquiring 
institution exercises voting rights only with a view to preparing 
the disposal of all or part of that undertaking or of its assets or 
the disposal of those securities; and the disposal takes place 
within one year of the date of acquisition (subject to extension by 
the Commission on request where the acquiring institution can 
show that the disposal was not reasonably possible within the 
period set).224 
2. Control by Insolvency Practitioner 
A concentration does not arise where control is acquired by 
an “office-holder according to the law of a Member State relating 
to liquidation, winding up, insolvency, cessation of payments, 
compositions or analogous proceedings.”225 
3. Holdco Maintaining Value of Investment 
The ECMR also exempts the acquisition of securities by 
certain holding companies, provided that such companies 
exercise the voting rights held in the target company only in 
order to maintain the value of the investment and not to 
determine the strategic commercial behavior of the target.226 It is 
likely that the three exemptions will have an increased relevance 
during the crisis. 
F. “Failing Firm” Defense 
The acquisition of companies on the brink of insolvency, so-
called “failing firms,” was already recognized as a special case in 
EU merger law.227 While the intentions of the acquirer might be 
to absorb a competitor that has fallen on hard times in order to 
fast-track the expansion of operations, the incidental effect may 
be to save assets that would otherwise exit the market. In light of 
 
224. See Commission Regulation No. 139/2004 (ECMR), art. 3(5)(a), 2004 O.J. L 
24/1, at 7. 
225. See id. art. 3(5)(b). 
226. See id. art. 3(5)(c). 
227. See Commission Guidelines, 2004 O.J. C 31/03, at 14 (on the Assessment of 
Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations 
Between Undertakings). 
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the economic crisis, Neelie Kroes has indicated that the 
Commission will take into account the failing firm defense 
“where applicable.”228 However, Nadia Calvino, Deputy Director-
General for DG Competition, has added that the Commission 
will remain “healthily sceptical” of attempts to rely on the 
defense.229 Aside from clearing mergers on a quick timetable, this 
is where the Commission may show some flexibility. 
1. Elements of the Defense 
The Commission Guidelines on the Assessment of 
Horizontal Mergers (“Horizontal Guidelines”) provide that: 
The Commission may decide that an otherwise problematic 
merger is nevertheless compatible with the common market 
if one of the merging parties is a failing firm. The basic 
requirement is that the deterioration of the competitive 
structure that follows the merger cannot be said to be caused 
by the merger.230 
In other words, where the competitive structure of the 
market would deteriorate to at least the same extent in the 
absence of the merger, a merger may be permitted.231 Parties 
wishing to claim the failing firm defense must prove three 
elements: First, the target would be forced out of market—it must be 
demonstrated that, in the absence of the merger, the target 
would leave the market because of financial difficulties if not 
acquired by another entity.232 Second, no alternative buyers—the 
parties must show that there are no alternative buyers that would 
cause fewer anticompetitive concerns.233 Third, the absence of the 
merger—it must be shown that the assets of the failing firm would 
inevitably exit the market. It is sufficient to show that a 
 
228. Kroes, Dealing with the Current Financial Crisis, supra note 41 (“[T]he 
Commission can and will take into account the evolving market conditions and, where 
applicable, the failing firm defence.”). 
229. See CLIFFORD CHANCE, OFT ACCEPTS FAILING FIRM DEFENCE IN HMV/ZAVVI 
(2009) (quoting Nadia Calvino, Remarks at the Law Business Research Conference: 
Competition Law under New Administrations—Convergence or Divergence? Views from 
Both Sides of the Atlantic (Apr. 27, 2009)). 
230. See Commission Guidelines, supra note 227, 2004 O.J. C 31/03, at 14. 
231. See id., 2004 O.J. C 31/03, at 14. 
232. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.2314, slip op. ¶ 37 (July 11, 2001) 
(BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim). 
233. See id. 
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substantial part of the target’s market share would have passed to 
the acquirer.234 More broadly, the parties must demonstrate that 
the failing firm would inevitably exit the market. 
2. The Defense in Practice 
The Commission has admitted the failing firm defense in 
only four cases.235 The Kali-Salz/MdK/Treuhand decision of 
December 1993236 is particularly pertinent to the financial crisis. 
The Commission held that where the merger is not the cause of 
the deterioration of competitive structure of the market, the 
legal consequences of the creation or reinforcement of a 
dominant position will not apply to the merger.237 However, it 
was noted that this situation would only apply in exceptional 
cases.238 The Commission was satisfied that in the actual 
economic situation, the company would not be able to survive, 
not least because the ongoing funding provided by Treuhand was 
prohibited by the rules of state aid.239 
The Commission’s decision was appealed by the French 
potash distributors, SCPA and EMC, to the ECJ, where the 
approach of the Commission was upheld and broadened to allow 
for the approval of a concentration where “the competitive 
structure resulting from the concentration would deteriorate to a 
lesser extent if the concentration did not proceed.”240 
In BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim, decided in July 2001, BASF 
argued that the conditions for a “failing company defence” were 
met in the proposed concentration.241 The Commission applied 
the criteria set out in Kali-Salz/MdK/Treuhand,242 and was satisfied 
that both Pantochim and Eurodiol would exit the market in the 
near future, as both companies had been placed under the 
 
234. See id. 
235. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5141 (Dec. 17, 2008) 
(KLM/Martinair); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.28210 (July 1, 2002) (Deloitte & 
Touche/Andersen UK); BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim, slip op.; Commission Decision No. 
IV/M.308 (Kali-Salz/MdK/Treuhand). 
236. See generally Kali-Salz/MdK/Treuhand, slip op. 
237. Id. ¶ 11. 
238. Id. ¶ 72. 
239. Id. ¶ 76. 
240. France v. Commission, Joined Cases C-68/94 & C-30/95, [1998] E.C.R. 1453, 
¶ 115. 
241. BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim, slip op. ¶ 135. 
242. Id. ¶¶ 145, 148, 150. 
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Belgian prebankruptcy regime, and it was confirmed to the 
Commission that if a buyer for the companies was not approved 
by a certain deadline, the companies would be declared 
bankrupt.243 Further, following a search by the Commission and 
the administrators of the companies, the Commission was 
satisfied that no less anticompetitive purchaser could be found 
within the relevant timeframe.244 
BASF argued that the remaining condition to be fulfilled, 
pursuant to the test that was good law at the time, that the 
acquiring undertaking would accrue all the market share of the 
target undertaking, was not a necessary prerequisite for the 
failing company defense, and that it would be sufficient if only 
part of the market share would accrue in the absence of the 
merger.245 The Commission accepted BASF’s argument and 
broadened the final condition to take into consideration whether 
the assets to be acquired would inevitably exit the market if not 
taken over by another undertaking.246 The Commission was 
satisfied that if the takeover did not go ahead, the assets would 
exit the market;247 further, it was held that following the merger 
BASF would not have an incentive to raise prices due to the 
economies of the case, which would result in more favorable 
conditions for the consumer.248 The Commission held that 
“deterioration of the competitive structure through the merger 
in the specific circumstances is less significant than in the 
absence of the merger.”249 
In the case of the proposed acquisition by Deloitte & 
Touche U.K. entities of the Andersen network in July 2002, the 
failing company defense was not raised by the parties 
themselves.250 However, while assessing potential concerns over 
collective dominance by the global accounting firms, the 
Commission held that a causal link between the proposed 
operation and the possible situation of collective dominance 
 
243. Id. ¶ 156. 
244. Id. ¶ 137(b). 
245. Id. ¶ 149. 
246. Id. ¶ 151. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. ¶ 162. 
249. Id. 
250. See generally Commission Decision No. COMP/M.28210 (July 1, 2002) (Deloitte 
& Touche/Andersen (UK)). 
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could be excluded, on the basis that the reduction from five to 
four global accounting networks was inevitable and that no other 
scenario could be established which would be less 
anticompetitive.251 
The Commission viewed the proposed concentration in the 
general context of the disintegration of the Andersen network in 
light of the Enron collapse, and accepted the argument that 
Andersen could no longer be considered a top-tier audit 
competitor;252 thus the reduction from five to four accounting 
networks was inevitable. As such, the Commission held that if the 
proposed transaction did not go ahead, only two possible 
scenarios would remain: either one of the other big four audit 
and accounting firms took over Andersen U.K., or no takeover 
occurred and the existing clients would be dispersed among the 
remaining big four firms.253 
Most recently, in December 2008, the Commission cleared 
the KLM/Martinair transaction in light of the failing firm 
counterfactual.254 The parties claimed that in the absence of 
KLM’s acquisition of Maersk Holding B.V.’s fifty percent 
shareholding in Martinair, Martinair’s long-haul passenger 
operations would likely be discontinued in the near future.255 
The business had been loss-making for a few years and Maersk 
Holding B.V. lacked any incentive to make the necessary 
investments as it no longer had any strategic interest in the 
aviation business.256 KLM already jointly controlled Martinair and 
Martinair’s competitive strength had been consistently 
decreasing; to regain its market position Martinair depended on 
KLM’s agreement to a renewal of its long-haul passenger fleet.257 
The Commission agreed that the competitive constraint exerted 
by Martinair would be eroded in the foreseeable future and 
therefore that the merger-specific effects of the proposed 
acquisition were likely to be limited.258 
 
251. Id. ¶ 44. 
252. Id. ¶ 45. 
253. Id. ¶ 49. 
254. Commission Decision No. IV/M.308, slip op. ¶ 412 (Kali-Salz/MdK/Treuhand). 
255. Id. ¶ 163. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. ¶ 21. 
258. Id. ¶ 175. 
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Those cases are the only cases in which the failing-firm 
defense has been allowed. The defense thus applies in 
exceptional circumstances only. The Commission’s conditional 
clearance of the acquisition by VB Autobatterie GmbH of FIAMM 
S.p.A.’s (“FIAMM”) automotive battery business in May 2007259 
exemplifies the hurdles to overcome for the failing-firm defense 
to apply. The transaction would have led to a reduction in the 
number of competitors in the market from three to two.260 The 
Commission conducted an in-depth investigation into FIAMM’s 
financial position and asset sale options, including the position of 
its creditors and any possible insolvency or liquidation 
procedures.261 It was held that it was by no means inevitable that 
FIAMM’s assets would exit the market, because smaller producers 
could purchase the machinery, production lines, and brands.262 
The key test was whether the merger causes a deterioration of the 
competitive structure in the market similar to the effect of the 
failure of the firm. In relation to each market, the Commission 
held that the structural harm caused by the merger would be 
more detrimental than the short-term effects of the failed firm 
(e.g., potential capacity gaps).263 The failing firm defense was 
thus rejected. Ultimately the Commission decided that the 
notified transaction would impede competition but that 
divestment of certain manufacturing capabilities and brands 
would address these concerns, and therefore gave conditional 
clearance.264 
3. Failing-Firm Defense: U.K. Perspective 
The criteria for meeting the failing-firm defense in the U.K. 
are similar to the tests used by the Commission.265 The OFT’s 
 
259. Commission Decision Summary No. 2009/C241/06, 2007 O.J. C 241/12, at 13 
(VB). 
260. Id. at 13. 
261. Id. at 14–15. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 13. 
264. Id. 
265. These criteria are codified in the Restatement of the OFT's position regarding 
acquisitions of ‘failing firms,’ issued in December 2008. The parties must present 
evidence that: (a) the target business would inevitably have exited the market in the 
near future absent the merger; (b) having demonstrably explored such options, there is 
no serious prospect of the target business being reorganized; and (c) there is no realistic 
and substantially less anti-competitive alternative. See Office of Fair Trading, 
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approach where Lloyds TSB Group plc (“Lloyds”) sought to 
acquire sole control of HBOS plc (“HBOS”) demonstrates that 
the OFT will not be easily convinced by the failing firm 
defense.266 In that case, the OFT believed that the assets would 
not leave the market because the most appropriate 
counterfactual involved some form of short to medium-term 
support from the U.K. government.267 
The OFT has cleared only five transactions on the failing-
firm defense under the Enterprise Act of 2002 (“Enterprise 
Act”); most recently, it approved HMV plc’s (“HMV”) buyout of 
Zavvi.268 HMV acquired fifteen former Zavvi music stores.269 This 
deal was cleared despite numerous local overlaps in the 
companies’ activities.270 The OFT received compelling evidence 
that (1) without the merger the stores would inevitably have 
exited the entertainment retail market as a result of Zavvi’s 
collapse (it went into administration at the end of 2008);271 and 
(2) there was no less anticompetitive alternative to the merger in 
the overlap areas, including no other realistic entertainment 
retail purchaser for the stores.272 
Although members of Zavvi’s previous management 
acquired ex-Zavvi stores in other areas, there was clear evidence 
that the landlords of the stores to be acquired by HMV would not 
have reached agreement on acceptable tenancy terms with this 
new management group.273 In light of this evidence, the OFT did 
not consider it necessary to undertake a detailed market analysis. 
 
Restatement of OFT’s position regarding acquisitions of ‘failing firms,’ OFT1047, at 4 
(Dec. 2008) (U.K.); see also Competition Commission & Office of Fair Trading, Merger 
Assessment Guidelines, OFT1078, at 20–21 (Apr. 2009) (U.K.) (showing that similar 
criteria are included in merger assessment guidelines published by the OFT and the 
Competition Commission (“CC”) on April 20, 2009). 
266. Office of Fair Trading, Report to the Secretary of State for Business Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform: Anticipated acquisition by Lloyds TSB plc of HBOS plc, at 
paras. 59–60 (Oct. 24, 2008) (U.K.). 
267. Id. ¶ 85. 
268. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Clears Acquisition of Zavvi Stores by 
HMV Under 'Failing Firm' Analysis, No. 47/09, at 1 (Apr. 28, 2009) (U.K.). 
269. Id. at 2. 
270. Id. at 1. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
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In January 2009, defense was allowed on a transaction in the 
U.K. cheese sector.274 The Competition Commission cleared the 
transaction, despite the fact that the number of large players in 
the market would be reduced from three to two, because this 
would happen whether the target was acquired or left the 
market.275 
It is likely that more companies will attempt to use the 
failing-firm defense in an economic recession and, without any 
softening of the interpretation, it may be that more and more 
transactions satisfy the necessary criteria. The OFT will take 
account of prevailing economic and market conditions when 
assessing evidence put forward by merging parties, and has noted 
that these conditions will be particularly relevant to “an 
evaluation of evidence on the inevitability of a business exiting 
the market (because of, for example, cash flow difficulties or an 
inability to raise capital), and the realistic availability of 
alternative purchasers for an exiting business (as a result, for 
example, of difficulties in raising investment finance).”276 
Firms should, however, be under no illusions that it will be 
easier than before to meet the conditions, because although the 
market is changing, its standards of review are not.277 It might be 
expected, however, that the level of detail of the review may be 
less intense in failing firm cases, where time is often of the 
essence. In this regard the OFT has confirmed that “[i]f there is 
a very strong failing-firm defence, we will not consider it 
necessary to do a detailed analysis of the competitive overlaps 
which we might normally do. That should enable us to do more 
of these cases faster.”278 Peter Freeman has also recognized that 
increased flexibility may be needed in relation to divestments, 
although he also said, “But further than this we should not 
go.”279 
 
274. Competition Commission, Long Clawson Dairy Limited/Millway merger 
inquiry, at para. 5 (Jan. 14, 2009) (U.K.). 
275. Id. ¶¶ 7, 10. 
276. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT publishes restatement of its 
approach to 'failing firms' in merger reviews, 146/08, at 1 (Dec. 18, 2008) (U.K.). 
277. John Fingleton, Chief Executive, Office of Fair Trading, Speech at the 
Conference on Competition Law Under New Administrations—Convergence or 
Divergence? (Apr. 27, 2009) (“[T]he standards we set in merger analysis are not 
changing, the market facts are.”). 
278. Id. 
279. Freeman, supra note 1, at 5. 
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G. Procedure for Clearance 
1. Phase I and Phase II: Waiting Period 
At the EU level, merger review takes place in two phases. 
Phase I concerns the Commission’s initial investigation period 
and lasts twenty-five working days starting the day following 
receipt of notification.280 An extension of ten working days may 
be granted where remedies (to address the Commission’s 
concerns) are offered, or a referral request from a Member State 
(where the Member State requests the case to be referred from 
the Commission to the Member State’s own competition 
authority) is received.281 Phase I concludes with a Commission 
decision either clearing (with or without conditions) the 
proposed transaction or initiating “Phase II” proceedings on the 
basis of serious concerns that the proposed transaction will 
damage competition.282 It is notable that in 2008, six percent of 
transactions received conditional clearance at Phase I,283 which is 
a higher percentage than in the last few years,284 perhaps 
indicating increased flexibility in avoiding Phase II. 
Phase II concerns the Commission’s in-depth investigation 
of serious doubts to competition raised during their Phase I 
investigation.285 Phase II lasts for ninety working days from the 
Phase II initiation date. This ninety working day period may be 
extended. If remedies are offered later than fifty-five working 
days after the initiation of a phase II investigation then the 
investigation period can be extended by fifteen working days. 
Alternatively, the Commission (with the agreement of the 
parties), the notifying parties themselves or a combination of 
both can request an extension, the cumulative total of which 
cannot exceed twenty working days. In the case of the notifying 
parties this request must be made within the first fifteen working 
 
280. See JOHN PARISI, A SIMPLE GUIDE TO THE EC MERGER REGULATION 7 (2009), 
available at www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/ECMergerRegSimpleGuide.pdf. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. at 8. 
283. See the statistics page for mergers on the website of the Commission for the 
European Communities, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/
statistics.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2010). 
284. Id. 
285. See PARISI, supra note 280, at 8. 
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days of phase II. Phase II concludes with the publication of a 
decision by the Commission either clearing the concentration 
(with or without conditions) or blocking the transaction.286 
2. Derogations 
In the EU, a suspensory regime precludes concentration 
with a Community dimension before notification of the 
transaction or until the Commission declares it compatible with 
the common market by the Commission.287 The Commission 
may, however, grant a derogation to the statutory waiting period 
upon request.288 Grant of a derogation from this obligation 
enables the immediate (if partial) implementation of the 
transaction. One can imagine that, in the context of rescue 
mergers, the buyer would be keen to at least have the ability to 
monitor the target’s risk portfolio and to take appropriate 
measures to preserve value of assets if necessary. The 
Commission has stated that such derogations will be granted 
“where there is urgency and where there are no ‘a priori’ 
competition concerns.”289 
In this respect, the Commission will take into account the 
effects of the derogation on the parties to the transaction or on 
third parties, and the threat to competition posed by the 
concentration.290 The derogation may be subject to conditions 
and obligations “in order to ensure conditions of effective 
competition.”291 Application for the derogation can be made at 
any time, whether before the notification or after the 
transaction.292 
Derogations from the suspensory regime were previously 
granted only in exceptional circumstances.293 The Commission 
has shown a willingness to be flexible in light of the financial 
crisis, finding exceptional circumstances more frequently than 
 
286. See id. 
287. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, art 2(3), 1989 O.J. L 395/1, at 4, corrected 
version in 1990 O.J. L 257/13 [hereinafter Merger Regulation]. 
288. Id. art. 7(4), at 7. 
289. Kroes, Dealing with the Current Financial Crisis, supra note 41. 
290. See Merger Regulation, supra note 292, 1990 O.J. L 257/13. 
291. Id. art. 5. 
292. Id. art. 7.  
293. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. COMP/M.2621, 2005 O.J. L 138/18 
Commission Decision No. IV/M.3209, 2003 O.J. C 212/9. 
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before.294 Six such derogations were granted in 2008, including 
allowing the Santander/Bradford & Bingley transaction to close 
immediately.295 It was also reported that BNP Paribas was 
overseeing the trading floor activities of Fortis Bank Belgium 
pending the Commission’s approval of the transaction, and even 
injected cash into the target prior to clearance to keep it afloat.296 
A derogation was also granted in the STX/Aker Yards297 case in 
March 2008, and five have been granted in 2009.298 
3. Blocking Transactions 
Of all cases notified to date, the Commission has prohibited 
a mere twenty mergers.299 The most recent of these was the 
Ryanair/Aer Lingus300 case, which the Comission prohibited on 
June 27, 2007. This relatively low figure reflects the Commission’s 
relatively light touch and broadly noninterventionist approach to 
merger regulation. There is no indication yet of a reversal of this 
trend, but the Commission’s flexible approach may be tested by 
the potential wave of consolidations that may result from a 
loosening of credit. 
H. U.K. Mergers 
1. Banking (Special Provisions) Act of 2008 
The Banking (Special Provisions) Act of 2008 (“BSPA”) 
allows the U.K. Treasury to nationalize a failing bank, or to direct 
its transfer to a third party.301 The power is exercisable by order 
for two purposes: to maintain financial stability or to protect the 
public interest where financial assistance has already been 
 
294. See COMPETITIVE MERGER CASE STATISTICS, supra note 163. 
295. See id. 
296. Commission Decision, No. COMP/M.5384, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n Dec. 3, 
2008) cited in 2009 O.J. C 7/05 (BNP Paribas/Fortis). 
297. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4956, 2009 O.J. C 147/11 (STX/Aker 
Yards). 
298. See COMPETITIVE MERGER CASE STATISTICS, supra note 299. 
299. See Martin Bechtold & David Gabathuler, European Union: The Ripple Effect, 
INT’L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1, 2008. 
300. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4439, 2008 O.J. C 47/05 (Ryanair/Aer 
Lingus). 
301. Banking (Special Provisions) Act, 2008, c. 2 (Eng.). 
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provided to maintain financial stability.302 An order may provide 
for the transfer of securities or assets and must make provision 
for compensation to the shareholders or, in the case of an asset 
transfer, to the bank itself.303 
Section 12 affords the treasury a very broad power to make 
“supplementary, incidental or consequential provision 
[including the power to] disapply (to such extent as is specified) 
any specified statutory provision or rule of law.”304 As a result, the 
treasury can order transferring one bank to another and 
disapplying U.K. merger control legislation.305 This power has 
been used most notably in the case of Bradford & Bingley, where 
article 40 of the order transferring assets to Santander expressly 
provides that “Part 3 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (mergers)(c) 
shall not apply to the first or second transfer save insofar as it 
gives effect to an obligation under Community law.”306 Arguably 
this provision was unnecessary since the merger fell within the 
ECMR in any case, but it was most likely designed to cover the 
risk that the deal might be repatriated to the U.K. Interestingly 
this provision was not used in the HBOS/Lloyds case.307 
2. Case Study: HBOS/Lloyds 
a. Public Interest Interventions 
In September 2008, the British government brokered the 
acquisition of the failing HBOS plc (“HBOS”) by Lloyds TSB 
Group plc (“Lloyds”) for UK£12.2 billion, to create the country’s 
largest bank and mortgage lender.308 For the merger to proceed, 
the Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (“Secretary of State”) had to intervene. 
 
302. See id. 
303. See id. 
304. Id. § 12. 
305. See id. 
306. The Bradford & Bingley plc Transfer of Securities and Propety etc. Order, 
2008, S.I. 2008/256 (U.K.). 
307. Decision by Lord Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Business (Oct. 31, 
2008), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file48745.pdf [hereinafter 
HBOS/Lloyds]. 
308. Id. 
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The Enterprise Act contains the U.K. merger regime.309 One 
of the goals of the updated regime was to remove politics from 
the merger process by making the OFT and CC independent 
authorities.310 Notification of mergers in the United Kingdom is 
voluntary, but parties can be required to undo transactions that 
pose particular competition problems if this is deemed necessary 
after the transaction is implemented.311 The OFT has a duty to 
refer mergers to the CC where it believes a relevant merger 
situation has resulted or may result in a substantial lessening of 
competition (“SLC”) in any U.K. market.312 
The Act provides for the Secretary of State to intervene in 
mergers that raise concerns relevant to the public interest, either 
under the grounds specified in the Act, or grounds the Secretary 
of State believes should be specified.313 The Secretary of State 
issues an intervention notice, and the OFT must provide a report 
to the Secretary of State within such a time as he may specify.314 
The OFT’s conclusions on the competitive effects of the merger 
are binding, but ultimately the Secretary of State has the 
discretion to refer the merger to the Competition Commission or 
to clear it on public interest grounds.315 
Previously there were only two public interest grounds, 
media plurality and national security,316 and they had been 
invoked only six times.317 However, the Secretary of State has the 
power to add new public interest considerations by laying an 
Order before Parliament that is approved by resolution of each 
house within twenty-eight days.318 The Secretary of State 
exercised this power in HBOS/Lloyds to introduce “[t]he interest 
of maintaining the stability of the UK financial system” as a new 
public interested consideration.319 The Secretary of State 
 
309. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (Eng.). First provisions came into force on April 1, 
2003. The remaining substantive competition provisions came into force on June 20, 
2003. Id. 
310. See id. 
311. See id. 
312. See id. § 41. 
313. See id. § 42. 
314. See id. 
315. See id. 
316. See id. 
317. See id. 
318. HBOS/Lloyds, supra note 307. 
319. Id. 
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highlighted the “systemic importance of HBOS plc to the UK 
banking system” which necessitated his intervention “given the 
serious threat to the stability of the UK financial system” when 
explaining his actions.320 
It is worth noting that other European countries have also 
introduced such measures. In October 2008, the Irish Parliament 
passed emergency legislation enabling the Irish Minister for 
Finance to clear mergers on financial stability grounds despite 
any SLC.321 In Italy, the government passed a decree in August 
2008 precluding the Italian Competition Authority from blocking 
mergers between large companies deemed to be “in crisis” and 
from ending a monopoly situation brought about by such a 
merger within a period of three years.322 The decree allowed the 
CAI consortium’s merger of Alitalia and Air One,323 although it 
has subsequently been declared potentially unconstitutional by 
an Italian regional court.324 
b. The Secretary of State’s Decision 
In its report to the Secretary of State, the OFT concluded 
there was a “realistic prospect” that the merger would result in 
an SLC in relation to personal current accounts, banking services 
for small and medium-sized enterprises, and mortgages.325 A 
detailed inquiry by the CC was therefore warranted, although it 
was “by no means a foregone conclusion” that the CC would find 
an SLC under the “balance of probabilities” standard that applies 
to CC investigations.326 
 
320. Id. 
321. See Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill, 2008 (Act No. 45/2008 (Ir.). 
322. Decree No. 134/08 was converted into law 166/08 and contained “urgent 
measures on the restructuring of major corporations in crisis.” GE.S.A.C. S.P.A, 2008 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND REPORT 11 (2008), available at http://www.portal.gesac.it/
portal/page/portal/internet/inGESAC/Profilo/Bilanci/Bil._ENG._2008web_0.pdf. 
323. See id. 
324. Finding by the Italian Administrative Court of First Instance (TAR Lazio) on 
May 20, 2009, in TAR LAZIO, Ordinanza n. 983/2009, solleva q.l.c. dell'art. 1, c. 10, del 
d.l. n. 134/2008 (decree to Alitalia) sulle regole della concentrazione tra Alitalia e Air 
One. 
325. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING [OFT], OFT REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON 
LLOYDS/HBOS MERGER (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/
resource_base/Mergers_home/decisions/2008/LloydsTSB. 
326. OFT, ANTICIPATED ACQUISITION BY LLOYDS TSB PLC OF HBOS PLC, REPORT TO 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISE AND REGULATORY REFORM 6 (2008), 
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Despite these findings, Lord Mandelson decided not to refer 
HBOS/Lloyds to the CC327 pursuant to section 45 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002 on the basis that the benefits of the 
transaction for the stability of the U.K. financial system 
outweighed the potential for the merger to result in 
anticompetitive outcomes, despite the OFT’s concerns. He 
stated, “On balance, [the Secretary of State] has concluded that 
ensuring the stability of the UK financial system justifies the anti-
competitive outcome which the OFT has identified and that the 
public interest is best served by clearing the merger.”328 Lord 
Mandelson’s decision was nine pages long, and relied heavily on 
submissions from the Bank of England, the Financial Services 
Authority, and the U.K. Treasury.329 
c. Timetable 
The following timeline traces events affecting the decision 
to approve the HBOS/Lloyds merger. On September 18, 2008, 
the Lloyds/HBOS deal was announced. The Secretary of State 
issued an intervention notice the same day.330 On October 7, 
2008, a Draft Financial Stability Order was laid before 
Parliament.331 The next day, the U.K. unveiled a UK£500 billion 
bank rescue package.332 On October 13, 2008, recapitalization 
measures for RBS, HBOS, and Lloyds were announced.333 Later 
that week, on October 16, the draft order was debated in the 
House of Lords.334 The draft order was subsequently debated in 
the House of Commons on October 20, 2008.335 On October 23, 
 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/press_release_attachments/
LLloydstsb.pdf. 
327. HBOS/Lloyds, supra note 307. 
328. Id. 
329. See id. 
330. Id. 
331. The Enterprise Act 2002 (Specification of Additional Section 58 
Consideration) Order 2008, No. 2645, 2008 (Eng.). 
332. See Euro Area Looks to UK for Bank Rescue Blueprint, EURACTIV, Jan. 29, 2004, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/euro-area-looks-uk-bank-rescue-
blueprint/article-176280. 
333. See UK Banks Receive £37bn Bail-out, BBC NEWS, Oct. 13, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7666570.stm. 
334. 704 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2008) 849 (U.K.). 
335. House of Commons, Second Delegated Legislation Committee, Enterprise Act 
2002 (Specification of Additional Section 58 Consideration) Order 2008 (Oct. 20, 
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2008, the Financial Stability Order was passed, and it entered 
into force on October 24, 2008.336 Also on October 24, the OFT 
submitted a report to the Secretary of State on the Lloyds/HBOS 
merger.337 On October 31, 2008, the Secretary of State issued its 
decision not to refer.338 On December 10, 2008, the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) dismissed the appeal by the Merger 
Action Group (“MAG”).339 
d. Criticism of the Clearance 
The decisions to clear the HBOS/Lloyds transaction and to 
set aside the OFT’s competition concerns were heavily 
criticized.340 The government tried to reassure the public that the 
merged bank would still be subject to competition law, but few 
people found this statement comforting because ex post 
enforcement is significantly less effective than initial prevention 
of the merger.341 
The decision was subsequently appealed in the CAT by the 
MAG, representing a group of account holders, bank employees, 
and business people, as a disproportionate and therefore 
unlawful use of the Secretary of State’s discretion.342 MAG further 
claimed that the Secretary of State’s discretion had been fettered 
 
2008), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/
cmgeneral/deleg2/081020/81020s01.htm. 
336. The Enterprise Act 2002 (Specification of Additional Section 58 
Consideration) Order 2008. 
337. OFT, supra note 325. 
338. Id. 
339. See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Merger Action Group v Secretary of State 
for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, http://www.catribunal.org.uk/
237-3402/1107-4-10-08-Merger-Action-Group.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). 
340. See BUSINESS AND TRANSPORTATION SECTION, THE LLOYDS-TSB AND HBOS 
MERGER: COMPETITION ISSUES, STANDARD NOTE, Dec. 15, 2008, H.C. SN/BT/4907, 
available at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/
snbt-04907.pdf; see also Louise Armitstead, Lloyds Merger with HBOS Under Fire as Sir Victor 
Blank Departs, TELEGRAPH, May 18, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
newsbysector/banksandfinance/5340255/
Lloyds-merger-with-HBOS-under-fire-as-Sir-Victor-Blank-departs.html; Jill Treanor, 
Pressure Grows on Brown Over Lloyds Merger Deal, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 16, 2009, at 6. 
341. Robert Peston, Creation of Lloyds HBOS, BBC NEWS, Sept. 17, 2008, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2008/09/
the_creation_of_lloyds_hbos.html. 
342. Merger Action Group v. Sec’y of State For Bus., Enter. and Regulatory 
Reform, [2009] CAT 19, 1107/4/10/08 (sitting as a tribunal in Scotland) (judgment for 
expenses). 
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by announcements made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and the Prime Minister prior to the decision.343 The CAT heard 
the case on December 8 and 9, 2009 and on December 10 
delivered its judgment dismissing the action as “wholly without 
merit.”344 
The MAG had, in particular, raised an issue with the 
counterfactual used to assess the merger’s impact on 
competition.345 The OFT submitted that the appropriate 
counterfactual would be a scenario in which the government 
would give some form of capital injection, guarantee, or other 
support in the short term, which would allow HBOS to continue 
exerting competitive pressure in the market.346 This situation, the 
OFT argued, would be preferable in terms of competitive effect 
to the merger.347 
The HBOS/Lloyds transaction could have been justified on 
the basis that one of the key problems with HBOS at the time was 
one of confidence and that there was a real risk of a bank run 
triggered by the worries of individual depositors and financiers 
that the others would pull out their money. If the takeover could 
convince the depositors and financiers that the HBOS balance 
sheet was not at risk, then the case for allowing the transaction 
would be compelling on that ground alone. 
That would have been a sufficient solution only if the sole 
problem with HBOS was a lack of depositor confidence. Yet, the 
more fundamental problem was that the bank’s underlying assets 
were unsound. This problem was not unique to HBOS. The 
problems were systemic, and were about insolvency (namely, bad 
loans) as much as they were about liquidity (i.e., depositors 
withdrawing their money).348 
By the time the decision was made, the UK£200 billion 
package of systemic support for the U.K. banks was already in 
 
343. Merger Action Group v. Sec'y of State for Bus., Enter. and Regulatory Reform 
[2008] CAT 36, 1107/4/10/08 (sitting as a tribunal in Scotland). 
344. Id. 
345. Id. 
346. See id.; see also OFT, supra note 325, at 23–24 (explaining that with a short-term 
government rescue package, HBOS would “still be able to exert competitive pressure in 
the market”). 
347. See OFT, supra note 325, at 24 (reasoning that the effects of this measure 
would, over time, leave HBOS a “significant player” in the market). 
348. See John Vickers, The Financial Crisis and Competition Policy: Some Economics, 
GCP, Dec. 2008, at 6. 
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place,349 as were the recapitalization measures. The package 
provided for measures to boost bank capital, including 
government subscription of capital and government guarantees 
to issue new debt.350 These measures were aimed at addressing 
the systemic problem rather than the woes of just one bank,351 
but they were arguably also sufficient to sustain HBOS. Some 
commentators have therefore argued that once this support was 
in place, the decision to clear the HBOS/Lloyds transaction was 
unnecessary and an economic mistake, risking an irreversible loss 
of competition in banking services in Great Britain, and 
especially in Scotland.352 
The circumstances surrounding the clearance indicate that 
despite the provisions of the Enterprise Act of 2002, which 
purported to make the OFT and CC independent authorities,353 
competition policy in the United Kingdom is far from insulated 
from political pressure. That may be desirable in cases that have 
the potential to dictate the course of the economy. In such cases, 
the government itself should be more hesitant to overlook long-
term competition concerns. That result will probably require 
further advocacy by the competition authorities. 
3. Changes to Merger Analysis 
Although the OFT has confirmed that the economic crisis 
will not affect the standard of review for mergers,354 companies 
can expect a change in the analysis. John Fingleton, Chief 
Executive of the OFT, has highlighted that the old assumptions 
may no longer apply. At a recent conference, Fingleton made 
reference to an online merger the CC cleared in 2008 on the 
basis of two “bricks and mortar” competitors that would exert a 
competitive constraint on the merged entity.355 Those two 
retailers subsequently left the market as a result of the crisis, 
demonstrating that historical performance in the market could 
 
349. See Press Release, HM Treasury, Financial Support to the Banking Industry, 
100/08 (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_100_08.htm. 
350. Id. 
351. See id.; see also Vickers, supra note 348, at 4–5. 
352. See Vickers, supra note 348, at 9. 
353. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, ¶ 1.1 (Eng.). 
354. See Craig Pouncey & Kriakos Fountoukakos, Mergers in Times of Crisis: ‘Business 
as Usual’?, EUR. ANTITRUST REV. 2010, 22–23. 
355. Fingleton, supra note 277.  
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be little indication of future market structure.356 That is not an 
isolated instance. In September 2007 the OFT cleared a merger 
between two video game retailers on the basis of significant 
competitive pressure from traditional market players such as 
Woolworths, which subsequently went into administration.357 
Fingleton indicated that the same could apply to 
assumptions about new entrants.358 Companies would be 
rethinking business plans to expand into new markets given the 
current downturn and difficulties in obtaining credit.359 Merging 
parties drawing attention to potential new entrants as a 
competitive constraint may therefore find their arguments are 
increasingly less convincing.360 Fingleton also raised concerns 
that assumptions around the competitive constraints exerted by 
imports may require revision, as the fluctuating exchange rates 
may make historically competitive imports relatively less cost-
effective.361 The overall message was that the past may no longer 
be a good basis on which to predict the future.362 
4. Remedies 
The financial crisis will likely also affect the remedies the 
Commission offers or accepts to secure clearance of transactions. 
For example, it might be expected that some companies, if 
forced to quickly sell overlapping parts of the business, may 
suffer large losses or may not be able to procure a buyer at all. 
The selling party may, in particular, fear that competitors will 
attempt to frustrate the disposal process and ultimately the deal 
itself. The Commission may be more lenient, accepting 
alternatives to structural remedies. On the other hand, there may 
 
356. Id. 
357. See id.; see also OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, OPINION, COMPLETED ACQUISITION BY 
GAME GROUP PLC OF GAMESTATION LIMITED, ¶ 50 (Sept. 3, 2007). 
358. Fingleton, supra note 277. 
359. Id. 
360. J. Thomas Rosch, a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, posits 
that this may lead enforcement agencies to take more aggressive action (e.g., blocking 
mergers). J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r Fed. Trade Comm’n, Implications of the Financial 
Meltdown for the FTC, Remarks at the New York Bar Association Annual Dinner, (Jan. 
29, 2009). 
361. Id. 
362. See id. (“In a time of considerable volatility, whether that's exchange rates or 
market demand, we can't rely on the past as such a good predictor of the future. That 
has made the analysis more complex.”). 
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be an increased number of up-front buyer requirements, as the 
Commission tries to ensure that the transaction will not go ahead 
unless a buyer is found. But such requirements inevitably delay 
any clearance, which may be unacceptable in rescue merger 
situations. 
III. CARTELS 
A. Incentives in Economic Downturn 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty (now article 101 TFEU) prohibits 
anticompetitive agreements between undertakings.363 
Anticompetitive conduct is a very broad term that includes price 
fixing, setting price increases, restricting supply or production 
capacity, and market or customer allocation.364 It can also include 
exchanges of information.365 
More than ever, firms are facing increasing pressure to 
maintain their margins and to retain customers in the current 
economic climate. This may lead to diverging incentives. There 
may be a temptation for competitors to agree not to sell below a 
certain price, or not to compete for customers in certain 
geographic regions, both of which are “hardcore” restrictions 
under article 81 EC Treaty.366 On the other hand, countering this 
incentive to collude with competitors is a temptation to defect 
from any existing agreement in the hope of capturing market 
share, or even to blow the whistle on any existing cartel 
agreement to obtain immunity from fines. 
Any firms considering the collusion option should pay 
attention to the Commission’s recent statements on cartel 
enforcement. The Commission has emphasized that it will not 
turn a blind eye because of the financial crisis.367 Neelie Kroes 
 
363. TFEU, supra note 13, art. 101, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 88–89; EC Treaty, supra note 
13, art. 81, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 73–74. 
364. See sources cited supra note 363. 
365. See sources cited supra note 363. 
366. EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 81, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 73–74. 
367. ALAN RILEY, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, THE MODERNISATION OF 
EU ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT: WILL THE COMMISSION GRASP THE OPPORTUNITY? 22 
(2010). 
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sees cartels as “infectious” misbehavior,368 and is intent on 
rooting them out regardless of the financial crisis. She argued: 
This matters more than ever in 2009 as millions of families 
face problems with their budgets, and law-abiding businesses 
struggle to survive. None of these people need the cost and 
hassle of competition problems to make life worse for them. 
So we have no intention of doing anything except 
maintaining our enforcement AND finding ways to speed 
our economic recovery.369 
There will be no “recession defense” for cartelists. 
It will be interesting to see how the competition authorities 
approach the arguments that firms will put forward in light of the 
financial crisis. The justifications will likely fall into two 
categories: (1) anticompetitive behavior justified by the poor 
business climate; and (2) claimed inability to pay the typically 
huge cartel fines. Cartels are often uncovered years after they 
have been implemented,370 so we might not see arguments of the 
first sort until any agreements entered into now, finally come to 
light in due course. Firms will more likely attempt to put forward 
the second type of argument, producing evidence that paying 
large fines under current market conditions would cripple 
chances of economic survival and lead to necessary lay-offs. The 
Commission has reassured consumers that it will not relent in 
punishing cartels,371 but the Commission may increasingly find 
itself in the position of having to judge whether the best interests 
of the consumer are really served by record-breaking fines. 
The crisis will undoubtedly create certain situations in which 
the normal rules appear not to apply. Governments may find 
themselves attempting to dictate prices to the market where 
there is a perceived benefit to the consumer. In November 2008, 
the Bank of England cut interest rates by one-and-a-half percent 
 
368. Kroes, Many Achievements, More to Do, supra note 10. 
369. Id. 
370. See Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Remarks at the American Bar 
Association Antitrust Section Spring Meeting: The Antitrust Division's International 
Anti-Cartel Enforcement Program (Apr. 6, 2000) (“[T]he majority of the international 
cartels that we have prosecuted or that are currently under investigation are believed to 
have already existed continuously for 5–10 years or longer.”). 
371. See European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Action Against Cartels—
Questions and Answers (2009) (“Since June 2005 an entire Directorate . . . has been 
involved exclusively in helping the Commission to detect and punish cartels.”). 
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to three percent.372 The majority of banks failed to pass these 
savings on to borrowers.373 Amid mounting fears that the 
monetary expansion would not result in the desired boost in 
spending, Alistair Darling, the U.K.’s Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, demanded that the banks adjust their interest 
rates.374 And when the interest rate was reduced to two percent in 
December 2008, the U.K. Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, 
insisted that banks pass on the cut to consumers.375 Though the 
motives behind those pleas were understandable, they did not 
take account of losses to savers, nor of the relative ability of banks 
to attract deposits. 
If the Commission remains true to its historical policy on 
cartels, the financial crisis will affect the Commissioner’s pursuit 
of cartelists. The Commission may show some flexibility in the 
application of procedural rules, however, where there is no 
enforcement loss. Firms themselves may be increasingly 
interested in the alternatives to full fines, namely those contained 
in the immunity/leniency and settlement regimes. The rest of 
this Part considers the effect of the financial crisis on these 
procedural elements. 
B. Immunity/Leniency 
1. The 2006 Leniency Notice 
The immunity and leniency regime in the EU is arguably the 
Commission’s most effective tool in cartel detection. Not only 
does the regime encourage parties to blow the whistle on 
anticompetitive agreements, it also rewards the voluntary 
disclosure of information of probative value during the 
 
372. See Helen Power & James Charles, Darling Summons Bank Chiefs Over Rate Cut 
Failure, TIMES (London), Nov. 7, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article5105630.ece (“Yesterday, the 
Bank of England slashed interest rates by 1.5 percent to 3 percent.”). 
373. See Brown Will Press Banks to Pass on Full Rate Cut, TIMES (London), Dec. 5, 
2008, http:// business.timesonline.co.uk/ tol/ business/ industry_sectors/ 
banking_and_finance/ article5292173.ece.  
374. Id. (quoting the Prime Minister as saying, “Remember the last time there was 
a cut, we spoke with [the banks] before it was passed on [to the customers].”). 
375. Id. (“The Bank of England yesterday cut the interest rate to 2 per cent.”). 
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Commission’s investigation.376 Each year new records are set for 
the number of leniency applications received.377 
The current system is set out in the 2006 Leniency Notice,378 
which came into effect on December 8, 2006 and replaced the 
2002 Leniency Notice.379 Companies are able to apply for 100 
percent immunity from fines or, if this is not available, for a fixed 
range of percentage reduction in any fine.380 The reduction 
bracket and final amount of any reduction will depend upon the 
timing of the application and the value of any cooperation.381 
The Commission will consider whether the leniency program 
applies after it has established a total fine pursuant to its Fining 
Guidelines.382 
It is important to note that neither immunity nor a 
reduction of fines under the leniency program can protect an 
undertaking from private damages actions.383 The Commission 
itself has been encouraging private enforcement,384 and there 
may be an increase in the number of follow-up damages actions 
as corporate customers, in particular, explore every way to 
improve their own balance sheets. 
For cash-strapped firms, immunity may be more attractive 
than waiting to see if another collaborator takes the plunge first. 
When one firm cooperates with the Commission and is granted 
immunity, leniency becomes the best case scenario for the 
remaining firms if there is sufficient evidence of their 
involvement. 
2. Eligibility for Full Immunity 
The application for immunity must be made before the 
Statement of Objections (“SO”) has been issued and the 
 
376. Commission Notice, 2006 O.J. C 298/11, at 17 (Cartel Cases). 
377. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION: COMMISSION LENIENCY NOTICE—
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2006). 
378. Cartel Cases, 2006 O.J. C 298/11, at 17. 
379. Id. at 22. 
380. See id. at 17–18, 20. 
381. See id. at 20, 21. 
382. See id. at 20. 
383. See id. at 22. 
384. See id. 
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Commission has the discretion to disregard an application if it is 
submitted after this time.385 
Under the 2006 Leniency Notice, the Commission will grant 
full immunity from any fine to the first company to fulfill two 
tests.386 The first test relates to the provision of certain evidence 
by the applicant to the Commission.387 The second test concerns 
the applicant’s ongoing cooperation with the Commission.388 
a. Sufficient Information for “Targeted Inspection” 
The first test is satisfied once the company has submitted 
sufficient information to enable the Commission to carry out a 
“targeted inspection” in connection with the alleged cartel,389 or 
to come to an infringement decision.390 Naturally, the 
Commission must not already have been in possession of 
sufficient evidence to carry out such an inspection or to come to 
an infringement decision.391 
The term “targeted inspection” is unknown in European 
competition law and is not defined in the 2006 Leniency Notice. 
The intent and meaning of the term therefore remains unclear. 
To seek to meet the “targeted inspection” threshold, an 
applicant must submit a corporate statement containing (to the 
extent that it would not jeopardize the inspections and as far as it 
is within the company’s knowledge), inter alia, a detailed 
description and explanation of the cartel, including its activities, 
meetings, scope and duration. 
b. The Cooperation Obligation 
The second test requires the company to fulfill certain 
criteria to qualify for immunity (the cooperation obligation). 
The company must (1) cooperate fully and continuously with the 
Commission’s investigation, including promptly providing all 
 
385. See id. at 19. 
386. See id. at 17–18. 
387. See id. 
388. See id. 
389. See id. at 18. This assessment is made exclusively on the basis of the 
information submitted by the applicant, without taking into account whether such 
inspection is actually carried out or whether the raid is successful. See id. 
390. See id. 
391. See id. 
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evidence that comes into its possession, remaining at the 
Commission’s disposal to answer questions, making employees 
and directors available for interviews, and not destroying, 
falsifying, or concealing relevant information;392 (2) end its 
involvement in the suspected cartel;393 (3) not destroy, falsify, or 
conceal evidence of the alleged cartel or disclose the 
contemplated application to third parties other than competition 
authorities in contemplation of the application;394 and (4) have 
taken no steps to coerce others to participate in the cartel.395 
3. Marker System 
A company that wishes to apply for immunity may apply to 
the Commission for a marker to hold its place at the front of the 
queue while it prepares a formal application.396 The Commission 
then has discretion on a case-by-case basis, to decide whether or 
not to grant a marker and for how long the marker will be 
valid.397 
To apply for the marker, the applicant must submit to the 
Commission the names of the parties to the alleged cartel, the 
names of the products and territories, the estimated duration of 
the cartel and the nature of the alleged cartel conduct, and 
details of any actual or contemplated leniency applications to 
other competition authorities in relation to the alleged cartel.398 
The Leniency Notice, issued in 2006, requires a level of 
information at an early stage that is significantly higher than in 
other jurisdictions’ marker systems.399 The applicant must also 
justify its request for a marker.400 For example, the acquirer of a 
business who discovers a cartel in the course of their due 
diligence or after the purchase of the business, and consequently 
notifies the Commission about the cartel. In view of both this 
 
392. Id. at 18–19. 
393. Id. 
394. Id. 
395. Id. 
396. See id. at 19. 
397. See id. 
398. See id. 
399. See, e.g., Competition Bureau Canada, Cartels—Immunity Program, 
http://www.bureaudelaconcurrence.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02928.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2010) (showing the Canadian anticompetition regime requires less 
initial information for an applicant to request a marker). 
400. Cartel Cases, 2006 O.J. C 298/11, at 19. 
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information requirement and the Commission’s discretion, the 
marker system is less attractive and more uncertain than 
elsewhere in the world. 
4. Eligibility for Leniency 
The program also offers a percentage reduction in the total 
fine to companies that choose to cooperate with the Commission 
during the course of its investigation.401 Such companies must 
fulfill a two-part test. First, they must provide evidence which 
represents “significant added value” with respect to the evidence 
already in the Commission’s possession.402 Second, they must 
comply with the Cooperation Obligation, as detailed above. 
Under the 2006 Leniency Notice, the percentage range of 
reduction available depends on the’ timing of the application. 
The notice provides for the following fixed ranges of reduction: 
(1) the first company to provide significant added value receives 
a fine reduction of thirty to fifty percent, (2) the second 
company to provide significant added value receives a fine 
reduction of twenty to thirty percent, and (3) any subsequent 
cooperating companies receive a fine reduction of up to twenty 
percent.403 The level of any fine or reduction under the leniency 
program is notified in the Commission’s decision at the end of its 
administrative procedure. 
C. Settlement 
On June 30, 2008, the Commission formally introduced its 
new procedure for settling cartel cases, set out in two documents: 
Commission Regulation No. 662/2008, amending Regulation 
773/2004404 and the Commission Notice on the Conduct of 
Settlement Procedures in View of the Adoption of Decisions 
Pursuant to article 7 and article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003 in Cartel Cases.405 On the same date, the Commission 
also published a “Q & A” document intended to provide 
 
401. See id. at 22. 
402. Id. at 20. 
403. See id. 
404. Commission Regulation No. 622/2008, 2008 O.J. L 171/3. 
405. Commission Notice, 2008 O.J. C 167/01 (Settlement Procedures Notice). 
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responses to frequently asked questions about the settlement 
procedure.406 
The overriding principles of the settlement procedure 
established by the Commission is that parties do not have an 
automatic right to settle their case and that the Commission will 
retain full discretion throughout the process.407 Under this 
procedure, the parties, having seen the evidence in the 
Commission’s file, they may choose to acknowledge their 
involvement in the cartel and their liability.408 In return for this 
acknowledgment, the Commission can reduce the fines imposed 
on the parties by ten percent.409 The Commission has been quick 
to point out that the settlement procedure will not enable 
companies to negotiate with the Commission as to the existence 
of an infringement of EU law or the basic level of the fine.410 
Commentators have been skeptical on this point, the general 
feeling being that a dialogue with the Commission on the level of 
fine must include some element of negotiation of the amount, 
otherwise firms would not be willing to settle for a mere ten 
percent reduction. In any case, firms may be attracted to the 
increased certainty on the eventual level of fine that such 
dialogue may bring. 
Companies accused of cartel behavior will be very interested 
in any potential fine discounts in the current economic climate, 
particularly as a speedy resolution of any cartel investigation will 
ease shareholders’ minds. Firms will also be keen to limit their 
financial uncertainty in any way that they can. However, that 
benefit may be offset by fears that the written acknowledgement 
of guilt that is required to proceed with settlement must surely 
strengthen the case for any follow-up damages actions lodged by 
customers. Such damages actions are being encouraged by the 
Commission,411 and may become more popular as the financial 
crisis drives customers to explore every available source of funds. 
On May 12, 2009, one of the participants in the cartel in 
animal feed phosphates reported that the Commission had 
 
406. Commission Press Release, Memo/08/458, (June 30, 2008). 
407. Id. at 1. 
408. See id. at 2. 
409. See id. 
410. See id. at 1. 
411. See Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM 0165 Final (Apr. 2008). 
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invited the firms involved to engage in settlement discussions.412 
This follows the announcement by Infineon in February 2009 
that the Commission had invited it to consider settlement in the 
DRAM investigation.413 
Other firms subject to cartel investigations will keenly await 
the outcome of those settlement discussions. If a significant fine 
reduction is achieved (albeit an unofficial one) that will 
encourage other firms to settle, which is good for firms that want 
to limit the liability provision on their balance sheets, and also 
for the Commission, which will be eager to demonstrate that its 
newly introduced settlement procedure works. However, the 
Commission may face conflicting incentives. On the one hand, a 
speedy settlement would free up scarce resources and allow the 
Commission to maintain its energetic enforcement agenda 
during the financial crisis. On the other hand, the Commission 
will not want to be accused of letting the firms get off lightly and 
may therefore resist the temptation to settle with a low fine. 
D. Fines 
1. The 2006 Fining Guidelines 
For all cases where an SO has been or is issued after 
September 1, 2006, the level of fines will be determined by 
reference to the 2006 Fining Guidelines.414 Given the 
Commission’s wide discretion in calculating fines and the lack of 
published decisions under the new guidelines, the final amount 
is difficult to predict.415 There is no plea bargaining or formal 
provision for negotiating a fine in advance of a final decision.416 
The maximum level of fines that the Commission can 
impose on an undertaking demonstrated to have participated in 
 
412. See Michael Antalics et al., Developments in International Cartel Enforcement and 
Leniency Agreements: 2008 to 2009, ANTITRUST REV. AM. 2010 (2010), 
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/20/sections/71/chapters/786/
international-leniency-agreements. 
413. See id.; see also Abigail Rubenstein, Law 360, Settlement Looms in DRAM Antitrust 
Battle, LAW360, Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.law360.com/articles/152205. 
414. Commission Guidelines, 2006 O.J. C 210/02, at 2 (on the method of setting 
fines imposed pursuant to article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No. 1/2003 (2006/C 210/02)) 
[hereinafter Fining Guidelines]. 
415. Id. at 2. 
416. Id. at 3. 
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a cartel is ten percent of that undertaking’s total turnover in the 
preceding business year.417 Within this limit, the Commission has 
discretion regarding the level of the fine it imposes on an 
undertaking, although its discretion must be exercised in 
accordance with the Fining Guidelines.418 
2. Calculation of the Fine 
The Commission’s methodology for setting fines is to 
determine the “basic amount” of the fine and then to adjust that 
basic amount upwards or downwards.419 The basic amount is set 
by reference to the value of the undertaking’s sales of goods or 
services to which the infringement relates in the relevant area 
within the European Economic Area (“EEA”) in the last full 
business year of the infringement.420 Depending upon the 
perceived gravity of the infringement, a proportion of up to 
thirty percent of the relevant sales value will be taken.421 This 
number will then be multiplied by the number of years the cartel 
existed,422 and then a further fifteen to twenty-five percent of 
sales by value may be added in order to deter undertakings from 
entering collusive agreements.423 That last element may be 
considered an “entry fee” and will be applied to all cartelists, 
however brief their participation in the cartel.424 Together, this 
gives the “basic amount.” 
The basic amount is then adjusted by reference to 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In particular, the basic 
amount may be increased for recidivism,425 failure to cooperate, 
and if the undertaking was the leader or instigator of the 
 
417. Id. at 4. 
418. Id. at 3. 
419. Id. at 2. 
420. Id. This is in contrast to the 1998 Fining Guidelines under which an 
infringement was classified as “minor[,] serious[, or] very serious[,]” with each 
classification having a corresponding likely level of fines (e.g., €20 million for very 
serious infringements) regardless of the size of the market concerned. Commission 
Guidelines, 1998 O.J. C 9 (on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 
15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (O.J. C 9, 14.1.1998, p. 
3)). 
421. Fining Guidelines, supra note 414, 2006 O.J. C 210/02, at 3. 
422. Id. 
423. Id. 
424. Id. 
425. Id. at 4. 
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infringement. Fines may also be increased to deter firms with a 
particularly large turnover in the relevant market.426 The level of 
the fine may then need to be adjusted to take account of the ten-
percent-of-turnover maximum427 and for reductions applied in 
view of immunity or leniency applications.428 Mitigation 
circumstances include: (1) termination of the infringement as 
soon as the Commission intervenes; (2) the infringement 
committed negligently; (3) involvement in the infringement was 
limited; (4) effective cooperation with the Commission outside 
the scope of the Leniency Notice and beyond the obligation to 
do so; and (5) the anticompetitive conduct was authorized or 
encouraged by public authorities or legislation.429 
3. Fining Practice 
In 2008, the Commission issued seven cartel decisions and 
imposed fines of over €2 billion. That includes the massive fine of 
€1.3 billion imposed on participants in the Car Glass cartel in 
November 2008 for dividing geographic markets, allocating 
customers, and exchanging commercially sensitive 
information.430 There was no immunity applicant in the Car Glass 
case, as the Commission launched its own investigation following 
initial information provided by Member States’ NCAs through 
the European Competition Network (“ECN”).431 One of the 
companies, Saint-Gobain, was fined €900 million alone.432 
The Commission has taken advantage of the provisions in 
the Fining Guidelines to significantly increase the fines in a 
number of cases due to the presence of aggravating 
circumstances.433 In the Car Glass cartel, Saint Gobain’s fine was 
increased by sixty percent because it was a repeat offender, and 
in the largest increase imposed by the Commission for repeat 
 
426. Id. 
427. Id. 
428. Id. 
429. Id. 
430. Commission Decision No. COMP/39.125, slip op. ¶ 731 (Eur. Comm’n Nov. 
12, 2008) (Car Glass). 
431. Id. ¶¶ 715–19. 
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offenses, Arkema France’s fine was increased by ninety percent 
for its involvement in three previous infringements prior to the 
Sodium Chlorate Paper Bleach cartel.434 
In the Aluminum Fluoride cartel, the Commission applied, 
for the first time, point eighteen of the 2006 Fining Guidelines, 
which allows the Commission to use sales outside of the EEA to 
which the infringement related, and apply them to the sales 
within the EEA to give a value of sales figure that reflects the 
gravity and geographical spread of the infringement.435 More 
recently the Commission fined E.ON and GDF Suez a total of 
€1.106 billion for operating a market sharing agreement in 
France and Germany.436 
The Commission fined Intel €1.06 billion for using anti-
competitive practices to exclude its only competitor (AMD) and 
thus reduce consumer choice in the worldwide market for it its 
“x86 central processing units,” in breach of article 82 of the EC 
Treaty.437 Although this was not a cartel case, it shows that the 
Commission is not shying away from extremely large fines. On 
the contrary, the Commission appears to be ramping up the 
pressure on firms engaging in anticompetitive behavior to 
protect consumers at a time when consumers will be concerned 
about how much they pay for their goods and services. As Neelie 
Kroes commented: “Given that Intel has harmed millions of 
European consumers by deliberately acting to keep competitors 
out of the market for over five years, the size of the fine should 
come as no surprise.”438 
4. Financial Constraint Discount 
When setting a fine, the Commission may, upon request, 
and only in “exceptional cases . . . take account of the 
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undertaking’s inability to pay the fine in a specific social and 
economic context”439—for example, where the amount of the 
fine is far in excess of the assets held by the company.440 It is 
important to note that the Commission is not obliged to take that 
into account441 and that the mere finding of an adverse or loss-
making financial situation is not sufficient to obtain a reduction, 
although evidence of the financial impairment of the party in 
question must be adduced.442 The undertaking must provide 
objective evidence that the fine would “irretrievably jeopardise 
the economic viability of the undertaking concerned and cause 
its assets to lose their value.”443 This is known as the “financial 
constraints” or “bankruptcy” discount.444 
The bad news for cartelists coming under scrutiny during 
the financial crisis is that the discount has been applied only 
rarely. In this respect the interpretation of the requirement that 
the “specific social context” warrants the reduction will be key. 
In the i case, the Commission reduced the fine of one 
undertaking by sixty percent, taking into account, among other 
things, the fact of falling beef consumption due to the spread of 
mad cow disease.445 In Electrical and Mechanical Carbon Graphite 
Products, the Commission did not accept one party’s submission 
that a large fine would force that party to breach certain financial 
covenants in its financing agreements, because it would be too 
easy for parties in the future to ensure their financings were 
structured in such a way as to allow reliance on that defense.446 
Further, the Commission dismissed the argument that one 
company needed all of its financial resources to resist the 
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http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38359/en.pdf. 
  
2010] COMPETITION POLICY IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1735 
worsened business climate on the basis that all companies were 
facing the same business climate and if the Commission reduced 
the fine for one party that would be discriminatory.447 In Speciality 
Graphite the Commission held that it could not reduce the fine 
for parties in financial distress because to do so would be 
“tantamount to conferring an unjustified competitive 
advantage.”448 However, the Commission did grant the discount 
to one party because not only was it in financial distress, but also 
the Commission had imposed a large fine (€80.2 million) the 
year before.449 A discount of thirty-three percent was therefore 
applied.450 
It remains to be seen whether the Commission will be 
convinced by those claiming an inability to pay due to the 
financial crisis. Another option available, also used rarely in the 
past, is payment by installments. In Amino Acids, the Commission 
refused to allow a financial distress discount but did agree to 
allow the party to “propose acceptable periods for payment of 
the fine on the condition that it demonstrates its inability to 
pay.”451 
It is also possible to request that the fine not be recovered 
immediately, in which case the party must provide a bank 
guarantee.452 One factor that may be considered is whether it is 
in the Commission’s interest to recover the fine immediately—
for example, if doing so will trigger liquidation of the company, 
in which case the Commission would have to enter its claim as an 
unsecured creditor.453 
In exceptional circumstances only, it will be possible to 
apply for an exemption from the obligation to provide a bank 
guarantee.454 It will be necessary to prove that it is objectively 
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impossible for the party to provide such a guarantee by providing 
letters of refusal from banks at which the party is a regular 
customer. It will also be necessary to prove that the guarantee 
could not be provided by another entity in the same group of 
companies. Combinations of these measures may be available, as 
demonstrated in Romana Tabacchi SpA v. Commission455 where the 
Commission showed significant flexibility in allowing partial bank 
guarantees and staggered payments. 
While the Commission is aware that firms will be interested 
in exploring the availability of such options in the present 
climate, it has been keen to confirm that financial constraint 
discounts “could only be granted if paying the fine would 
endanger the economic viability of the company and cause its 
assets to lose all their value. While this situation might occur in 
the context of the crisis, we would make an extremely careful 
assessment before granting any such reduction.”456 
CONCLUSION 
The financial crisis presents the Commission with a 
formidable challenge: to react flexibly to the emergency situation 
without compromising on the standard of enforcement. It 
remains to be seen whether the €3.5 trillion of state aid or the 
record-breaking four-week merger clearances in the financial 
services sector represent an improvement in procedural 
efficiency, or short-term expediency for businesses at the expense 
of market competition. Many have perceived such rushed jobs as 
the U.K. HBOS/Lloyds merger as unnecessary and dangerous 
precedents. The fear is that ex post review can never be as 
effective as preventing a transaction in the first place because it 
can be extremely difficult to unscramble the proverbial egg. 
The Commission has repeated at every opportunity that 
competition laws are not being sacrificed for short-term gains. In 
some respects, it has shown laudable rigidity in its application of 
established rules. The competition authorities have affirmed that 
flexibility will be granted in procedure (e.g., speedy review of 
state aid merger applications, derogations from the suspensory 
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regime, financial constraints discounts, and merger remedies) 
and that flexibility built into the existing rules will be exploited 
(e.g., failing-firm defense, exemptions to the ECMR, public 
interest interventions, and the article 87(3)(b) EC (now article 
107(3)(b) TFEU) exception to the prohibition on state aid. 
Those exemptions, derogations and carve-outs, however, are 
supposedly reserved for extraordinary cases only. Future 
competition policy will be shaped by how broadly the 
Commission interprets the exceptions, and the extent to which it 
successfully applies—or fails to apply—its financial crisis 
procedures to a post-crisis world. 
